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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Currently, we are facing globalization of the World Market as reflected in the
astonishing increase of multi-national corporations. Accordingly, cross-border transaction
of business is also on the way of great increase in amounts and numbers. However, those
cross-border business transactions are to be subject of the regulation of foreign
government, and this tendency is especially true in the merger transaction.
From the situation described above, businessmen with interest in establishing
transnational mergers will need to know the other party's governmental regulations as
well as those of their own. This task of becoming knowledgeable of transnational merger
laws is potentially complicated since there is no international standard of merger
regulation at this time. Each country with merger regulations has developed them from
their own country's social, economical, and political necessities. Thus, one can expect
many discrepancies, mismatches, and non-parallel regulations across countries and
communities (e.g., European Community) that will cause problems during a merger
transaction. Therefore, the current situation does not leave any other choice for those
businessmen but to become knowledgeable on the other party's regulations when they
prepare for a transnational merger. Depending on their social, political, economical
policies, each of the nations has developed its own legal system to prevent unfair
economic activity, and to promote their own industries by regulating and controlling their
market.
Importance of the Paper and Purpose
This is especially true in the case of the four economic bodies that will be
discussed in this paper—European Union (hereinafter European Community), the United
States, South Korea, and Japan. I will discuss the development of competition laws in
each of the countries and community, including merger regulation. As we will examine
in the paper, the United States has the longest history in the area of merger regulation as
well as competition law; and the other bodies, largely, have modeled their regulations
after those of the United States. In the case of the European Community, it has been
eight years since they have enacted the EC Regulation on the Control of Concentration
between Undertakings,' although they had mostly relied on Articles 85 and 86 of the
Rome Treaty' to control merger in their market. South Korea and Japan have
comparatively short histories concerning competition law and merger regulation. Due to
differences in the length of history of competition laws and merger regulations of the four
economic bodies, the task of comparative analysis is a difficult one, but that which is
needed in this changing global community.
The primary purpose of this paper is comparing and contrasting those four legal
rules of merger control, focusing on comparing two systems, those of the United States
and European Community, and furthermore comparing enforcement practices in these
four different bodies.
' Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on Control of Concentration between
undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 , as amended by 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
' Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treaty] arts. 85-86.
CHAPTER II
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)
Background of Implementing Merger Regulation in 1990
On December 21, 1989, the Council of Minister of the European Economic
Community (hereinafter EEC) adopted a regulation on the concentrations between
undertakings, and this regulation became effective on September 21, 1990.^ Before that
time, merger cases were brought under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, also known
as the Rome Treaty,'' which was the main source of the EC competition law. However, it
began to be criticized for its inadequacy in controlling merger cases under the two
articles. Articles 85 and Article 86 of the Rome Treaty.'
Article 85 of the prohibition states that "all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market."'' There is a considerable
loophole when the Article 85 is applied to address merger in which, sometimes, two
independent companies integrate to a single entity.^ That is. after a merger is
accomplished, there will be no party that is any longer independent. Assuming that there
must be more than at least two parties in order for a case to be ruled under Article 85. it is
' Merger Regulation, supra note 1
.
^ EC Treaty, supra note, arts. 85, 86
- C. J. Cook & C. S. Kerse, E. C. Merger Conikoi 2-5 (2d ed. 1996).
^ EC treat}', supra note, art. 85.
not theoretically possible to bring a merger case under Article 85.* The EC
Commission, in it's 1996 memorandum, declared that "it is not possible to apply Article
85 to agreement whose purpose is the acquisition of total or partial ownership of
enterprises or the reorganization of the of the ownership of enterprises (merger,
acquisition of holdings, purchase of part of the assets)."^
A landmark decision with respect to application of Article 85 to a merge is the
case of British American Tobacco Co./Reynolds Industries in 1987,'° in which Philip
Morris agreed to purchase stock of Rothmans Tobacco, Ltd. ("Rothmans"), a competing
cigarette manufacturer." The acquisition of 20.8% of stock gave Philip Morris 31% of
interests and 24.9% of the voting rights in Rothmans Tobacco Ltd.'^ the Commission
began its proceeding against Philip Morris, but settlement was made when Philip Morris
reached its agreement to keep its voting rights below 25%." Even though the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter ECJ) found that the behavior of Philip
Morris was not unlawful under competition law, the importance of this case is that the
court determined that Article 85 can be used to address merger cases as long as the parties
at issue remain independent after the merger.''*
^ Paul-Henri Freret, The European Union Regulation on "Concentrations" and United States Merger
Z,aw5, 2 TuL. J. INTL «S: CoMP. L. 143, 152(1964).
'Id
' Memorandum on the Problem of Concentrations in the Common Market, Competition Series, No. 3,
1966,^58.
'° Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd. & R. J. Reynolds/ Commission,
1987 E.C.R. 4487 (1987) [hereinafter Philip Morris]
"W. at 4493.
'^ Id at 4494.
" Id at 4495-97.
''' See Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European Union: How Should the United
States ' Experience Influence the Enforcement ofthe Council Merger Regulation'^, 6 J. Transnatl. & Pol'y
223,235(1997).
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On the other hand. Article 86, from its wording, is supposed to control abuse of
a dominant position. Article 86 prohibits "(a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."'^ When the article is interpreted strictly, there also appears a
loophole making it impossible to apply this article to every merger case and the loophole
lies on the scope of Article 86.'* That is, the article does not include the issue of the
creation of a dominant position. Therefore, Article 86 does not fulfill the requirement that
merger regulation must be prohibitive with respect to creation of a dominant position.''
However, in Continental Can Co./ Commission in 1973, which is the first merger
case brought to the ECJ, the court applied Article 86.'^ In this case, the Continental Can, a
U.S. company, acquired 86% of the shares in Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG (hereinafter
SLW), a German company.''' Later, with the financial help of its parent company (here.
Continental Can), SLW could acquire 91% of the shares in the Dutch Company,
Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa (hereinafter TDV).^° SLW was the largest German
producer of packaging and mental closures, and TDV was a leading manufacturer of
packaging material in the Benelux.'^'
The Commission found that the behavior of Continental Can was in violation of
Article 86 of the EC Treatv because the behavior in which Continental Can. as the one
'^ EC Trear> art. 86.
'* Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 2-3.
''Id
'* Case 6/72, Continental Can Co./Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215(1973) [hereinafter Continental Can].
'"Id at 2 18.
^Ud at 219.
^' Id at 219-20.
holding the dominant position, had acquired 80% of the shares in TDV through its
subsidiary (SLW), was an abuse of the dominant position that Continental Can had before
its acquisition at issue.^^
Continental Can appealed to the ECJ, arguing that Article 86 of the EC Treaty
could not be used to rule over a merger case because a merger is not the kind of abuse of
a dominant position listed in Article 86.'^ The ECJ dismissed this argument and upheld
the Commission's decision, thereby confirming again its position that competition cannot
be ever distorted in the Common Market.^^ By the decision in Continental Can, the ECJ
established the idea that Article 86 can be applied to a merger case.^'
Nevertheless, Continental Can inspired the Commission to submit to the Council
of Ministers of the EEC a proposal of adopting a cohesive merger regulation in 1973, but
it was rejected by many member states which did not want to yield their own sovereignty
on the matter of merger regulation to the EC Commission. ^^ After that time, the
Commission amended the proposal several times, but each time, it was rejected by the
Member States.'^ However, the judgement in Philip Morris pushed the Council to adopt a
merger regulation, and finally the Council, on December 21, 1989, adopted the regulation
on the control of concentrations between undertakings.'^^
Since the adoption of the merger regulation. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty will
not be applied to an agreement as far as the transaction will fall within the scope of the
'- Id. at 220.
^^ Id. at 223-25.
^* Id at 242-45.
" Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 2-5.
" Opi, supra note 14, at 235.
^'Id
" Id at 236.
merger regulation. However, if the transaction may fall beyond the scope, the
Commission and ECJ or national authority may apply those articles."
Jurisdictional Scope
One of the most important and differing aspects of the merger regulation from that
of the Rome Treaty lies in exclusive application of the regulation.^" In other words, if a
concentration at issue fall within the scope of the merger regulation, the regulation allows
only the Commission to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the concentration, thereby
leaving no chance for jurisdiction to any of the Member States.^' If the concentration, on
the contrary, does not fall within the scope of the merger regulation, the Commission is
excluded from exercising jurisdiction and national authorities of competition of each
member states will have jurisdiction over the concentration.^^
Depending on whether the Commission deals with a concentration or one of the
Member States does, the result of the case may greatly differ." From the reason above, it
is very important to clarify which concentrations fall within the scope of the regulation
and which concentrations fall beyond its jurisdictional scope. Not all concentrations are
addressed by the merger regulation. Rather, only those concentrations with community
dimension will be treated by the regulation. '*'' First, the definition of concentration will be
^' See Timothy G. Portwood, Mergers under EEC Competition Law 45-60 (European Community Law
Series No. 7, 1994).
'''See id at 48-57.
'- Id. at 57-59.
" See id at 57-59.
''Id
I
i
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explained, and second, the threshold test to determine community dimension will be
introduced.
Definition of Concentration
The Merger Regulation uses the word concentration instead of merger in order to
be more specific with its wording of the statute. Article 3 of the Merger Regulation is
devoted to the definition of concentration. A concentration is a durable change of
control. ^^ Article 3(3) of the Merger Regulation defines control as "the possibility of
exercising decisive influence on an undertaking."^^ The change of control can be
exercised in the various ways. According to Article 3(1), a concentration occurs when:
(a) Two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or one or more persons
already controlling at least one undertaking, or (b) one or more persons already
controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract, or by any other means, direct or indirect
control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.^^
Also, the Commission issued a notice called "Commission notice on the notion of
a concentration,""^* thereby providing the definition of concentration more in detail. The
following definitions are mostly excerpted from the Commission notice on the notion of
concentration.
'^ Morten P. Broberg, Merger Control in the European Community: A Summary ofthe Five Years since the
Introduction ofthe Merger Regulation, 19 World Competition-L. & Econ. Rev. 6, 7(1995).
^^ Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
'' Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
'* Commission notice on the notion of concentration under the Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 1994 O.J. (395) 1 [hereinafter
Notice on the Notion of Concentration].
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Mergers between previously independent undertakings . A merger within the
meaning of the Merger Regulation occurs where two or more undertakings combine into
a new undertaking and cease to exist as different legal entities, or may occur where an
undertaking is absorbed by another, the latter retaining its legal identity while the former
ceases to exist as a legal entity.^'
As well as mergers on the legal basis, mergers on the de facto basis may be
deemed as mergers within the meaning of the regulation when the combined activities of
previously independent undertakings results in the creation of a single economic unit
while those undertakings retaining their individual legal personalities/"
Acquisition of control. As described in the point (b) of Article 3(1) of the Merger
Regulation, a concentration may occur in a case of acquisition of control. Acquisition of
control, according to the Commission notice on the notion of a concentration, is divided
into two forms of acquisition."" Furthermore, sole control is "normally acquired on a
legal basis where an undertaking acquires a majority of the voting rights of a company.'"*^
Even if an undertaking acquired more than 50% of the share capital of a target company,
it does not normally confer control unless the undertaking also acquired a majority of the
voting right of the target company .''^ Sole control may be acquired in the case of a
"qualified minority", which can be established on a legal and'or defacto basis."*^ A legal
basis refers a case in which specific rights are attached to the minority shareholdings,
thereby enabling minority shareholder to determine the strategic commercial behavior of
"M HI 6-7.
*" Opi, supra note 14, at 237.
"' Notice on the Notion of a Concentration, supra note 38, t 13.
''Id.
''Id.
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the target company.''^ The power to appoint more than half of the members of the
supervisory board or the administrative board is one of the examples/*
A defacto basis refers to a case in which the shareholder is highly likely to
achieve a majority in the shareholders' meeting, because the remaining shares are so
widely dispersed that it is hardly expected all the smaller shareholders will be present or
be represented at the shareholders' meetings/^
Sole control can be exercised by a minority shareholder that has the right to
manage the company activities or to determine its business policy.'^* A change from a
joint control to a sole control is considered as a concentration in the meaning of the
Merger Regulation because "decisive influence exercised solely is substantially different
to decisive influence exercised jointly.'"*''
On the other hand, there is a joint control where "tu'o or more undertakings have
the possibility to exercise decisive influence over another undertaking."^^ Here, decisive
influence is defined as "the power to block actions which determine the strategic
commercial behavior of an undertaking."^' Even though the clearest form ofjoint control
exists where only two parent companies equally share the voting rights of the target
company, joint control can also exist even where there is no equality of voting rights."
This is the case in which minority share holders have additional rights so that they are
** Id.\ 14.
""Id.
''Id
''Id
'"Id^ 16.
'°Id^ 19.
^•/^.
"M 111120-21.
n
able to veto decisions "which are essential for the strategic commercial behavior of the
join venture."^'' Some examples of the veto rights are decisions about "the budget, the
business plan, major investments or the appointment of senior management."^''
Community Dimension
The Commission can apply the Merger Regulation only to the concentrations
which have the Community dimension." In order to give a clear-cut guidance of whether
the Commission will apply the regulation, the community dimension is based on the
turnover of the undertakings concemed.^^ The Merger Regulation provides five thresholds
which the concentration must meet to have a Community dimension." First, the
combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned must be more
than ECU 2,500 million.^^ Second, in each of at least three Member States, the combined
aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned must be more than ECU 100
million.^'' Third, in each of the three Member States included for the purpose of second
threshold, the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned
must be more than ECU 25 million.^" Fourth, the aggregate Community-wide turnover of
each of at least two of the undertakings is more than ECU 100 million.^' Lastly, when
each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
''
Id. II 22.
"'
Id. H 23.
^^ Merger Regulation, supra note 1 , art. 2 1 (2).
''" See Morten P. Broberg, supra note 35, at 10.
" Merger Regulation, supra note I, art. 3.
''Id
'"Id
'"Id
"'Id
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Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member States, the concentration
does not have Community dimension."
The Council broadened the scope of the Regulation by lowering the thresholds,
thereby enabling the Commission to exercise much broader jurisdiction. The original
thresholds are ECU 5,000 million world-wide turnover and ECU 250 million
Community-wide turnover, and the second and third thresholds are newly adopted
through the amendment in 1997.^^ Now, many concentrations which would have been
caught by national merger authorities will fall within the sole jurisdiction of the
Commission.
It must be noted that the Community dimension is considering two factors, the
amount of turnover and the location of the turnover.^'* From the ECU 2,500 million
world-wide turnover threshold and 1 00 million Community-wide turnover threshold, it is
clear that the regulation will not be applied to a concentration which does not reach to a
certain size (world-widely and Community-widely) nor to a concentration which does
meet a certain size in the world market but does not meet the test of Community turnover
that was intended to reflect a potential to affect the Community market.^^ Also, the
Merger Regulation will not be applied if each of the undertakings concerned achieves
more than two-thirds of its turnover within one and the same Member States. *'*' As a result
"^ See Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 61-62.
'^ See id at 62-66, 72-74.
'- See id
'^ Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(d).
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of this test, a merger between the two largest company can be subject to a national filing
if each of them achieves mostly within the same Member States.^^
Joint Venture-Distinction Between Cooperative And Concentrative Joint Venture
With regard to the joint venture, the Article 3(2) of the Regulation states that "the
creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the function of an autonomous
economic entity shall constitute a concentration"^* within the meaning of the Merger
Regulation. Also, the Article 2(4) reads that "[t]o the extend that the creation of a joint
venture constituting a concentration pursuant to Article 3 has its object or the effect the
coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings that remain independent, such
coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Article 85(1) and (3) of
the treaty, with a view to establishing whether or not the operation is compatible with the
Common Market."^^
The Merger Regulation is still distinguishing between joint ventures depending on
whether they are concentrative and fall under the Merger Regulation, or they are
cooperative and therefore fall under the application of Article 85(1) and (3). However, it
is sometimes very difficult to draw a line between these two types ofjoint ventures
because there is a great variance in joint ventures, ranging from merger-like operations to
cooperation for particular functions such as R & D. production or distribution.^"
For the above reason, the Commission, in December, 1994, published a notice on the
distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures in order to provide
''^ See Cook & Kersk, supra note 5, at 64.
"* Merger Regulation, supra note I. art. 3(2).
'" Id art. 2(4)^.
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guidance as to how the Commission interprets Article 3 of the Merger Regulation
before its change in relation to joint ventures."
According to the Article 3(2) of the Merger Regulation, in order for a joint
venture to be deemed to be concentrative, the joint venture must perform, on a lasting
basis, all the fianctions of an autonomous economic entity.'" In other words, the joint
venture must be performing all the functions normally carried out by other undertakings
on the same market, and to do so, the joint venture must have sufficient financial and
other resources including finance, staff, and assets. ^^ The notice reads that a joint venture
is not a fiill-function venture if it only takes over one specific function within the parent
companies' business activities without access to the market. The notice interprets the
term "on a lasting basis" as a condition in which the duration of a joint venture is enough
to change the structure of the undertaking concerned.'^
Compatibility Test
Article 2 of the regulation provides that "[a] concentration which creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared
incompatible with the common market." ' Therefore, it is most important to look at how
the Commission and ECJ interpret "a dominant position" and what kinds of factors are
^" Commission Notice on the Distinction between Concentrative and Cooperative Joint Ventures Under
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Bet\\een
Undertakings, 1994 O.J. (C 385) 1 [hereinafter Notice on the Distmclion].
'' Id.; see also Cook & K.erse, supra note 5. at 46-55.
'' See also Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 47-50.
'' Id
^' Notice on the Distinction, supra note 70, \ 1 6.
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taken into account to access to a dominant position. Furthermore, when determining
whether or not a proposed merger creates or strengthens a dominant position, it is also
necessary to properly define the product and geographic market where a concentration
may cause harm.
Defining The Relevant Market
The Merger Regulation does not provide any clear guidelines as to how to define
the relevant product market. ^^ Only section 6 of the form CO in the annex of the
Regulation states that "[a] relevant product market comprises all those products and/or
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by
reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.""" Therefore, it
is clear the Commission have taken into account a cross-elasticity of demand when
defining a relevant product market. ^^ The factor to be taken into account needs to be
explained more in detail with cases which reflect the pragmatic tendency of the
Commission as well as the ECJ.
First of all, as shown in the section 6 of the form CO, physical characteristics of
the product and intended end-use will be considered.^'' In other words, if two products
have so different physical characteristics that they cannot be expected to be used for the
same end-use, those products are not substitutable and belong to different markets. ''^ For
'''' Merge Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(3).
^'' Opi. supra note 14. at 248.
77 Form CO Relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to regulation (EEC) 4064/89, 1994 O.J.
(L 385) 1, Annex. Form CO lists data required for the notification of a concentration.
'* Opi, supra note 14, at 249.
^^ PoRTWOOD, supra note 29, at 66-68.
''Id
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example, in Renault/Volvo,^^ the Commission dealt with the reciprocal acquisition by
the two companies of45% shareholdings in each other's bus and truck businesses. The
Commission noted that the truck market was subdivided into three submarkets: (i) trucks
below five tons; (ii) trucks between five and sixteen tons; and (iii) trucks above sixteen
tons/^ The commission noticed that the main mechanical characteristics of the trucks,
such as the type of engines, the number of axles, and the type of trailers, were different/^
The technical aspects of the upper range were more sophisticated because the
requirements of durability and operating costs were greater than those for the
intermediate range/'' Trucks above sixteen tons were used in long haul, construction, and
long-distance distribution traffic.^' Furthermore, marketing conditions of trucks were
influenced by these technical differences/^
However, in most cases, this criterion of physical characteristics of the product
and intended end-use alone, cannot be expected to be enough to define a relevant product
market because certain products with very different physical characteristics and end-use
may be demanded as a substitute by consumers while products with very similar
characteristics and end-use may be demanded for different purposes/' For example, a
certain type of chemical product might be demanded by a cosmetic industry while there
is also demand from pharmaceutical industry/*
*' Case IV/M004, Renault'Volvo, 1990 O.J. (C 281) 2.
'- See id. H 9.
^^Seeid.\ 10.
*' Id
''Id
"Id
*' See Opi, supra note 14, at 250.
** See id
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Also, it is necessary to examine consumer preference along with product
characteristics and end-use.*"^ There might be a case in which even though physical
characteristic and end-use of two products are so similar as to be deemed interchangeable,
those products may not be considered to belong to the same market because consumers
strongly prefer one specific type of products over the other.'" In Nestle/Perrier,^^ the
Commission excluded soft drink from the market definition, based on consumer
preference.'"^ The Commission noted that bottled spring water was bought and regularly
consumed because of its image as a natural product and its association with purity,
cleanliness, absence of contamination, and a healthy style of life.'^ In order to reach that
conclusion, the Commission took into account three factors: preference of final
consumers; purchasing pattern of final consumers: and level of per capita consumption,
which was higher for bottled spring water than for soft drinks.'"
Sometimes, the Commission also has taken into account supply side
substitutability to define a relevant product market along with other factors'^ the
Commission may look at the possibility for a manufacturers of a certain product which is
not part of the relevant market to switch to producing products which are considered as
''Mat 25 1-53.
"^ See id
" Case IV/M 190, Nestle/ Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L 356) 1. The transaction in the case concerned bottled
mineral water in France; Nestle would acquire Perrier and, as part of the deal, would sale the Volvo source
of Perrier to BSN, a competitor. Id. ^ 10.
"'Id
''Id
"' ld*i 10-12.
' PORTwooD, supra note 29, at 66
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belonging to the relevant market, in a short period of time and without incurring
additional expenses or risks.'^
Of course, there are many other factors to be taken into account along with factors
so far introduced when establishing a relevant product market (such as price difference,
conditions of competition..., etc.).^^ The Commission and ECJ will define a relevant
product market after taking into account all the factors all together on the case-by-case
basis.'^
On the contrary to the relevant product market definition, the merger regulation
provides a definition for the relevant geographic market in Article 9(7): the relevant
geographic market consists of an area "in which the undertakings concerned are involved
in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas
because, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those
areas.
"^^ Also, the article reads that the assessment should take into account, in particular,
the nature and characteristics of the products or services concerned, the existence of entry
barriers or consumer preference, price difference, and/or appreciable differences of the
undertakings' market shares between the area concerned and neighboring areas. '°°
On the other hand, from the pragmatic aspect the Commission has developed, it is
revealed that the Commission has taken into account the following factors [although it
may sound similar to the definition in Article 9(7)]: the existence of regulatory barriers to
** See id.
'' See id, at 66-68.
^ Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(7).
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market interpenetration; national procurement policies; cross-border imports;
distribution and marketing infrastructure; transportation costs; consumer preferences;
potential competition in the market; price differences; differing market shares; language;
and differing local specific requirements."" That is, the Commission takes into account
whether or not legislation can constitute an absolute or partial barrier preventing trade
between different countries or geographic areas. "^^ This criterion also appears in the
regulation. '°^ For example, with regard to the pharmaceutical industry, the Commission
once found that markets in the pharmaceutical industry were national due to the very tight
legal framework under which the industry operates. '"^ There is also a national
procurement policy where a government or its departments are monopolizing a specific
industry and, as a result, all purchases are being done through domestic suppliers. '°^
Transportation cost also may play an important role in assessing a relevant
geographic market.'°^ This is especially true when the products concerned are low-cost
products which may accompany significant transportation costs, such as sugar, cement,
beer, or water because producers situated close to the consumers will have a cost
advantage compared to remote manufacturers."^^ As to the percentage that transportation
costs must represent in order to constitute an entry barrier, it is assessed on a case-by-case
'°' Opi, supra note 14, at 262.
'"^ See id.
'°' Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(7).
"*^ Set? Opi, 5wpra note 14, at 262 (citing the case of Sanofi/Sterling Drug, 1991 O.J. (C 156) 10, t 17).
'°'
Id. at 263-64.
"^ See id at 265.
'°' See id
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basis. '°^ In conclusion, what criterion will be used or not is mostly depending on the
Commission dealing with a specific case.'°^
Dominant Position
After finding a relevant market and measuring market shares of the undertakings
concerned, the Commission will examine whether or not a concentration creates or
strengthens a dominant position and also, if there is, whether or not effective competition
in the common market would be significantly impeded as a result of the dominant
position. "° Unfortunately, the Merger Regulation does not define "a dominant
position."'" However, since the concept of dominance was imported from the Article 86
of the EC Treaty, it is possible to define "a dominant position" ,as defined by European
Court of Justice in United Brands Co./Commission^^^ in 1978, as "a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of
effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of its consumers."""^
Although recital 15 of the preamble of the Merger Regulation provides that there
will not be a dominance where the market share of the undertakings concerned does not
exceed 25% either in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it, it is virtually
impossible to provide any meaningful guideline concerning how much market shares will
'°'' See id. at 265.
'"'See id. at 26 \-6S.
"° See PoRTWOOD, supra note 29, at 85-86.
'''See id
"• See Case 27/76. United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV/Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
[1978] C.M.L.R. 429.
'
'^ See id. at 277; Opi, supra note 14, at 272.
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be enough to establish a dominance."'' Even, the Commission has taken pragmatic
approaches depending on cases. "^ However, it may be possible to find hint from the
Commission's practice."^ When a concentration holds less than 25% of the combined
market share in the relevant market, impediment of effective competition is not likely and
compatibility will be presumed."^ If the market share ranges between 25% and 39%, a
finding of a dominant position is very rare, but not totally impossible."* When the market
share ranges between 40% and 69%, the Commission will look into the existence of
actual and potential competitors of merging firms along with other factors. When the
market share is above 70%, a dominance will be strongly presumed."^
The market shares of undertakings are important indium of dominance as the
Commission stated in Alcatel/Telettra}'^^ however, market shares are not only factor to be
considered, rather there are other many factors to be taken into account when determining
dominance.'"' For instance, the EC Commission in de Havilland^^^ noted that a high
market share could indicate the existence of a dominant position only where the market
share persists over time. Thus, persistence of power over certain period will be taken into
"'' Opi, supra note 14, at 274
'''Id.
117 See id. at 274-78; see also Lisa A. Barbot, Tracing the Extraterritorial Application and Enforcement of
European Union Competition Policy Concerning Transnational Mergers, 2 Yul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 235,
274(1994).
'''Id
'"Id
'-° Case IV/M. 042, Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48. The Commission stated that "a very high share
of any market share could indicate that a dominant position exists." Id. f^ 38-40.
'-' See Freret, supra note 7, at 154-61.
''^ Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. The Commission stated: "In general terms, a
concentration which leads to the creation of a dominant position may however be compatible with the
common market ... if there exists strong evidence that this position is only temporan, and would be quickly
eroded because of high probability of strong market entry. With such market entry the dominant position is
not likely to significantly impede effective competition within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger
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account when determining a dominance. The Commission also takes into account
existence of current or future competitors which may prevent an undertakings with a
significantly high market share from acting independently in the market. The
Commission stated in Tetra-Pak/Alfa-LavaP^ that "in certain rare circumstances even
such a high market share may not necessarily result in dominance. In particular, if
sufficiently active competitors are present on the market, the company with the large
market share may be prevented from acting to an appreciate extent independently of the
pressures typical of a competitive market."'^''
The Commission also takes into account the maturity of the market and
commercial or technical advantage over competitors.''^ If the market is mature, a high
market share of undertakings in a mature market is more likely to confer dominance than
a high market share is in a highly innovative and rapidly changing market. '^^ Also, where
an undertaking possesses a technical advantages over competitors owing to its secret
technology or a patent, the Commission consider this as one of most criterion in
accessing a dominant position.''^ In Du Pont/ICL^'^^ in which the Commission found that
the acquisition would have increased Du Font's marker share between 23% and 40%, the
Commission found that Du Font's acquisition of ICI, particularly in the field of sensitive
Regulation. In order to assess whether the dominant position ... is likely to significantly impede effective
competition therefore, it is necessarv' to assess the likelihood of new entry into the market." Id. \ 53.
'-' Case 1V/M180, Tetra Pak/Alfa-Lavel, 1991 O.J. (L 290) 35.
'-'
Id. 1 3(3); See also Case 1V/M042. Alcatel/Telettra. 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. The Commission cleared the
merger even though the post-merger amounted to a market share of 83% of Spanish microwave equipment.
The Commission found that entry barriers were not very high and the main competitors of Alcatel in Spain-
AT&T and Ericsson- were considered to be capable of increasing production within a short period of time.
Id 51-53.
''" See Freret, supra note 7, at 1 59-60.
''" See id
'-' See id.
'-' Case IV/M 214, Du Pont/ICI, 1993 O.J. (L 7) 13.
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nylon carpet fiber industry, would have provided Du Pont with a great technological
lead, and this, in turn, would have strengthened of its existing customers and given Du
Pont the ability to behave independently of its competitors.'^^ The concentration was
finally cleared after Du Pont promised to give up to sell sufficient production capacity to
bring its post-merger share down below the dominance threshold. '""^
Besides those described above, there are other factors which the Commission ECJ
will take into account when determining dominance, such as entry barrier, the existence
of gaps of market share between a dominant undertaking and its main competitor...,
etc.'^'
There is also a political factor which the Commission consider when assessing a
dominant position and compatibility.'''' The Commission and ECJ may take into account
the development of technical and economic progress.'" According to recital 13 of the
preamble of the Regulation , it is required to take into account the legal framework of the
achievement of the fundamental objectives which was referred in Article 2 of the EC
Treaty, including that of strengthening the Community's economic and social cohesion.'^''
In addition, the Merger Regulation confirms this Commission's position, provided that "it
is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition."'^'
'""
Freret, supra note 7, at 159.
"° 5ee /a'. H 48.
'^' Barbot, supra note 1 17, at 274-75.
'" See id.
'" See id.
'''' See Cook & Kerse, supra note 5, at 131-33.
'^' Merger Regulation, supra note 1 , art.2( 1 )(b).
24
With regard to oligopolistic dominance, the Merger Regulation does not provide
any wording, and there is only one case, Neslle/Perrier,^''^' in which collective dominance
was found to exist.'" In this case, the commission considered that the transaction would
create a duopolistic dominance which might significantly impede the effective
competition in the market, given the high market share that Nestle and BSN would have
after the Merger between Nestle and Perrier. Nestle and BSN both argued that the
Regulation does not apply to oligopolistic dominance.'^* Nevertheless, the Commission
concluded that the Regulation should apply equally to the creation of single firm power
or collective power.'^^ Later, the Commission allowed the transaction to proceed on
certain conditions and obligations. '''^
Procedural Aspects
Pre-Mer^er Notification
The Merger Regulation requires that concentrations with a Community dimension
be notified to the Commission not more than one week after the conclusion of the
agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling
"" Case IV/M 190, Nestle/Perrier, 1992 O.J. (L 356) \\see also supra note 91
"' See Pierre Raoul-Duval ET AL., The EEC Merger Control Regulation, SB04 ALI-ABA 357, 365-66
( 1 996); Cook. & Kerse;, supra note 5, at 1 34- 1 36; Portwood, supra note 29, at 79-85; see also Opi, supra
note 14, at 277-78.
''* See PoR-nv'ooD, supra note 29, at 81,82
"" Id
'''^' The Commission only allowed the merger on condition that Nestle sell off eight brands of mineral water
in a single package to a third party' in order to create a third force in the mineral water market in France
which will, in turn, challenge the duopolistic dominant position of Nestle and BSN. This third party had to
be approved by the Commission so that the latter could ensure that the purchaser had sufficient financial
resources and expertise to be an effective competitor on the French market. Id. at 148.
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interests, whichever comes first.''" In case of true merger, within the meaning of Article
3(1 )(a), or in case of an acquisition ofjoint control, within the meaning of Article 3(1 )(b),
a concentration shall be notified by the parties jointly. In other cases, the notification
shall be made by the acquiring party. '''^ The Commission may impose fines, ranging
from ECU 1,000 to 50,000 if parties obliged to notify fail to do so. In addition, if the
parties concerned supply incorrect of misleading information in a notification, they may
be subject to the fines of the same amount. '""^ Not until a transaction has been declared
with the Common Market, will it be realized in accordance with Article 7(1).'''''
As soon as the Commission receives a notification, it must proceed a so-called
first phase examination and decide whether or not it will approve the merger at issue
within a month.'"' The Commission will look the concentration as belonging to one of the
following situation: (a) the notification does not fall within the scope of this Regulation;
(b) the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of the Merger Regulation,
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market; (c) the
concentration notified falls within the scope of the Regulation and raises serious doubt as
to its compatibility with the common market.'''^ Where the notified concentration belong
to situation (a), the commission will, by means of decision, record that the concentration
'" Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
'"-
Id. an. 4(2).
'"^ Article 14(l)(a)-(b). The Commission also may impose fines if the parties concerned supply incomplete
business record or refuse to submit an investigation by the Commission. Id. art. 14( 1 )(c)-(d).
'"' Before its amendment in 1997, three weeks suspension was applied, in other word, a concentration
could not put into effect within the first three weeks following its notification. See Portwood, supra note
29, at 141-43.
'"*" Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art 10(1). When there is a request for referral of the case to a Member
State, this time-limit is extended to six weeks. Id.
^'^ Id art. 6(l)(a)-(c).
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does not have Community dimension.'"^ If the concentration notified falls within the
category (b), the Commission will decide not to oppose it and will declare it compatible
with the common market.''*^ In addition, the Commission may declare the concentration
compatible under certain conditions which the undertakings concerned must comply
with.''*'' As to the concentration in the category (c), the Commission will decide to initiate
proceedings which is also called second-phrase examination, and this procedure may last
four months while the first-phase may last up to only one month. '^°
In the second-phase examination, the Commission will carry out a close
examination of the concentration in liaison with the competent authorities of the Member
States.'" After this examination, the Commission will prepare a statement of objections
concerning the concentration at issue.'" Then, the parties concerned will have
opportunity to submit their observation. '^^ The Commission can base its decision only on
a statement of objections on which the parties had opportunity to submit their
observation.'^'' Next, a draft decision by the Commission will be prepared, based on the
objections and the observations, and this draft decision, in turn, is submitted for
discussion to the Advisory Committee which consists of one or two representatives of the
Member States.'" After this discussion, the Advisor>' Committee will deliver an opinion
'''Id art. 6(l)(a).
•''
Id. art. 6( 1 )(b).
''' Id
''"Id art. 6(l)(c).
''Id art. 19(2).
"Id art. 18.
"'Id art. 18(3).
"' Id
15? Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 19(3).
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on the Commission's draft decision. On the basis of this opinion, the Commission
makes a final decision. '^''
The Commission is supposed to make a decision normally within one month or, in
case of initiating the second-phase procedure, within five months including the first-phase
period.'" If the Commission does not take a decision within the period fixed for it, the
concentration will be deemed to be compatible with the common market. '^^
The Commission exercise exclusive power on the matters. '^^ Article 8 deals with
part of the Commission's power of decision. The Merger Regulation provides that the
Commission "may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure
that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into
vis-a-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the
common market. "'^° Also, if undertakings has already implemented a concentration
without previously notifying the Commission of their intention to merge or to acquire
shares in another undertakings, the Commission has power to require, by decision, the
post-merger undertakings or acquired assets to be separated or joint control to be ceased,
and also has power to take any appropriate action necessary to restore conditions of
effective competition."'' Besides, the Commission may revoke its compatibility decision
if the decision is based on incorrect information which at least one of the parties
"'/a', art. 19(4)
'''Id. art. 10(1)(3).
"'/£/. art. 10(6)
^-^ See PoRTU'ooD, supra note 29. at 1 30-3 1
.
""^' Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
"'' Id If the parties concerned, either intentionally or negligently put into effect the transaction during
suspension period, the Commission "may by decision impose fines not exceeding 10 % of the aggregate
turnover of the undertakings concerned. Id art. 7(2)(b). As to the concentrations which was not notified,
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concerned is responsible for or if the information was obtained by deceit.'" Article 1
1
of the Regulation provides that the Commission may require information from the
Governments and competent authorities of the Member States, and from undertakings or
association of undertakings.'"
Although the Commission possesses exclusive power in the decision of
compatibility, there is a limit. Thus, the ECJ have unlimited jurisdiction to review the
Commission's decision including fines and periodic penalty payments. The ECJ "may
cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payments imposed."'^'*
Negotiation Between the Commission and Undertakings
If a concentration notified falls within the jurisdictional scope of the Commission,
and has a significant possibility of impeding the effective competition in the common
market, the Commission will not approve the concentration. However, the Merger
Regulation is providing an opportunity for undertakings to be given clearance decision by
adapting the concentration in the way which the Commission put. Article 6(1 )(a) and
Article 8(2) are dealing with those opportunity. Thus, a concentration, otherwise will be
declared incompatible with the common market, will be cleared by modifying the
concentration by entering into commitments. Nestle/Perrier is one of the important
decision concerning the commitments.'^'^
the Commission may either deal with the case itself of refer the whole or the part of the case to the
competition authorities of the Member states. Id art. 9(3).
'*=
Id. art. 8(5)(a).
'" Id art. 1 1
.
"^ Id art. 16. The Merger Regulation also provides that "Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the
Commission shall have sole jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for m this Regulation." Id art.
21(1).
'* See PoRTwooD, supra note 29, at 138-39.
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In the case of Nestle/Perrier,^^^ the Commission cleared the merger only on the
condition that Nestle sell off eight brands of mineral water in a single package to a third
party in order to create a third force in the mineral water market in France, thereby
creating a condition to challenge the duopoly of Nestle and BSN.'^^ This third party had
to be approved by the Commission so that the Commission could ensure that the
purchaser had sufficient financial resources and expertise to be an effective competitor on
the French market. '^^ The settlement was reached, thereby denying Perrier the right to buy
any share in the relevant market for ten years. '^^
Exception to the Sole Jurisdiction by the Commission
The Merger Regulation provides the Commission with sole jurisdiction to take
decisions, only subject to review by the Court of Justice.'^" Furthermore, the regulation
provides that "[n]o Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to
any consideration that has a Community dimension.'''^'However, there are three
exceptions to this principle, which are known as the German, English and Dutch
clauses."'^
According to Article 9, also known as the German clause, the Commission may
refer a notified concentration to the competent authorities of the Member State where,
within three weeks of its receiving of the copy of the notification from the Commission,
the Member State notify the Commission that "a concentration threatens to create or to
'"'^ Nestle/Perrier, 1992 O.J. (1 356) 1.
'"' PoRTWOOD, supra note 29, at 138-39.
'^« See id
'"' See id
'^" Merger Regulation, supra note 1 , art. 2 1 ( 1 ).
'"/^. art. 21(2)
'" For more detail information, see PORTWOOD. supra note 29, at 50-59.
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strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded"''^ on a distinct market within that Member State. '^^ If the
Commission agrees that such a distinct market and a threat exist, it may either deal with
the case itself or may refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities of
the Member States concerned, with a view to the application of that State's national
competition law.'^^
Article 21, known as the English clause, opens a way for a concentration with a
Community dimension to avoid the exclusive application of the Regulation.'^'' This
Article allows Member States to take appropriate measure to protect "legitimate interests"
other than those considered by the Regulation, provided that they are compatible with the
general principles and other provisions of the Community law.'" Those legitimate
interests include "public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules. "'^^
According to Article 22, known as the Dutch clause, the Commission, at the
request of a Member State or at the joint request of two of more Member States, may
itself deal with the transaction without a Community dimension, applying the Merger
Regulation, if the Commission finds that the transaction, by creating or strengthening a
dominant position, has significant impeding of effective competition within the Member
State of States making the joint request.'" The Commission is allowed to take only the
''^ Merge Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(2)(a).
'''Id. art. 9(1),(2).
"- W art. 9(3).
''*5eeRaoul-Duval et al., 5wpra note 137, at 369-70.
'^' Merger Regulation, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
"* Id.
''"Id art. 22(3)
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measures strictly necessary to maintain or restore effective competition within the
territory of the Member States or states concerned. '^°
Remedies
In general, there are two types of remedial measures available under the Merger
Regulation and those measures are "divestiture" and "separation ofjoint control."'*'
Full divestiture calls for selling off and/or redistribution of the acquired assets or
undertaking from the purchaser and their recovering as an efficient and independent
competitor in the market.'^' Divestiture can result in a range from a few to too many
number of transactions.'*^ For example, the original seller can be offered with an option
to repurchase its interests, and/or the plant and equipment could be sold off to an
independent undertaking.'*'^ Separation ofjoint control is an efficient remedial measure
for joint ventures and similar situation such as cross directorship and cross
shareholdings.'*' This involves changes in voting right, management bodies, or
redistribution of capital between parent undertakings.'*^
Besides those two remedial measures introduce above, the Commission may take
any of the following actions:
1
)
ordering partial divestiture of the target company in the hands of acquiring
company;
2) ordering sterilization measures that permit acquisition of the challenged
'""'/cy. art. 22(5).
'*' See PoRTwooD, supra note 29, at 152.
''- See id
'^^ See id
"^ See id
"^ See id
''" See id
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ownership with restriction on its voting or managerial rights that may lead to
anti-competition effect;
3) ordering prohibitions on fiiture acquisitions in the same market; and lastly,
4) ordering investiture of an independent undertaking to which the required
assets are transferred. This measure is ordered when there is a danger that any
sale to a third party would results in an anti-competition effect as the
187
merger.
'«' See id.
CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES
Historical Background
Early cases involving mergers were tried under section 1 and section 2 of the
Sherman Act,'^* which were originally adopted to control the excessive economic and
political power concentrated on Oil, Steel and other monopolies. '^"^ However, the
Government faced with difficulties in dealing with merger cases with these statutes and
wanted tougher and more efficient law to regulate merger cases. '^° From this need, the
Government came to enact section 7 of the Clayton Act.'^' Now, it has become the
principal antitrust statute under which merger and acquisition cases are regulated.'^' The
section 7 of the Clayton Act was first enacted in 1914, and later strengthened by
amendments in 1950 (the Celler-Kefauver Act), 1980, and 1984."^
When it was originally passed, section 7 only prohibited stock acquisition of a
corporation engaged in commerce by another corporation also engaged in commerce "if
the effect might be substantially to lessen the competition between them, to restrain
'** 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1994). Section 1 states "[ejverv' contract, combination in the form of trust or
othetAvise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." Id § \. Section 2 states "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
Id § 2.
"" See Thomas W. Brunner et al.. Mergers in the New Antitrust Era 3-6 ( 1 985); see also Opi, supra note
14, at 226 n. 17,
'"^ See Id
'"' 15 U.S.C. §18(1994).
''' For general information, see Brunner et al., supra note 1 89, 3-5.
^'^ See id
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commerce in any section of the country, or to create monopoly.""'* There was not any
mention with regard to asset acquisition.'^' This was considered inadequate by the
Government because this lack ofjurisdiction was frustrating the merger agents' effort to
more aggressively attack mergers which may harm competition.'^'' There was another
problem, section 7 was apparently covering only horizontal mergers between direct
competitors, not either vertical mergers nor conglomerate mergers.''^ Consequently, the
Congress amended section 7 in 1950 through the Celler-Kefauver Act'^* and fortified it
by expanding its jurisdictional scope to acquisition of corporate assets and shares of
capital or stock, also enabling it to cover all three type of mergers. '^^
In addition, section 7 of the Clayton Act, by reading "may be," ^°°makes it clear
that it covers not only actual, realized anti-competitive effect, but also possible or
probable effect from transactions. ^°' Therefore, the merger enforcement Agencies or
private plaintiffs do not have to prove that a transaction at issue will have an adverse
effect on competition. Rather it is sufficient to show that there is a slight probability of
harm on competition. ^°^
"' 15U.S.C. § 18(1914).
'"- See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-15 (1962); see also Opi, 5wpra note 14,226
n.l6.
^^ See. e.g., in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.. 334 U.S. 495 (1948). the Justice Department tried,
under the Sherman Act, to stop United States Steel Company from acquiring the assets of the Consolidated
Steel Corporation, but the Supreme Court rejected this Justice Department's effort. Id at 521-23.
"^ See Brunner et al
,
supra note 1 89, at 3-5.
"' 15U.S.C. §§ 18&21.
'^ See Brunner et al., supra note 1 89, at 5-6.
'°° 15 U.S.C. §18(1994).
^°' Opi, supra note 14, at 244-45.
'°' Id
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There are also other resources for U.S. merger regulation. Enactment of Flart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act^"^ in 1976 began to provide specific thresholds
by which pre-notification to both Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) and the
Department of Justice may be required. ^°'* Most importantly, there are guidelines issued
by the Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ).^°^ Although these guidelines have no
legal binding on the courts, but they strongly suggest the merger agencies' intention and
policy concerning merger cases. ^'^^ Also, FTC issues statement, thereby providing a
secondary guideline.^"^
Jurisdictional Scope
One part of Section 7 of the Clayton Act states:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire
,
directly or indirectly, the whole part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly. ^^*
^°' 15U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
^°^ See Brunner et al
,
supra note 1 89, at 5,6.
^"^ The guideline explain how the DOJ will define markets, classifV mergers, analyze their competitive
impact, and assess certain defenses. Brunne;retal, supra note 189, at 13.
^°^Id at 13-14.
'°' Mat 3-5.
^°' 15U.S.C. § 18.
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As explained briefly, when it was originally passed in 1914, the jurisdictional range of
section 7 of the Clayton Act covered only stock acquisition between corporations
engaged in commerce.^"' However, by its amendment in 1 950, the Government added
assets acquisition to its jurisdictional scope. ^'° Also later, through its 1980 amendment the
jurisdictional reach of the Act was more broadened to include acquisitions virtually by
any type of entity, and as a result, there was no difference now under the statute whether
a transaction at issue is made by a corporation, a natural person, a partnership, a joint
venture, or some other type of business entity.^" Also, before its 1980 amendment, the
Clayton Act reached only transactions "in commerce,"^'^ thereby excluding from its
jurisdictional reach transactions between companies which were not directly engaged in
the production, distribution, or purchase of goods or services in interstate commerce. "^'^
However, by amending the statute to insert "any activity affecting commerce,"^ '^ U.S.
extended the jurisdictional scope, making it reach as far as does the Sherman Act.^'^
Consequently, the need for the Sherman Act sections 1 and section 2 also almost
disappeared. ^'^
Section 7 also itself contains an exemption from its broad jurisdiction.''^ It clearly
states that this section 7 would not be applied to persons purchasing stocks "solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
^°' See supra text accompanying notes 1 88-207.
^•° Id
^" Barbara A. Reeves & Linda R. Blumi<in, Acquisitions and Mergers, 890 PLI/Corp 473, 478.
^'^ 15U.S.C. § 18(1950).
^'^ See Reeves & Blumkin, 5w/7ra note 213, at 478-81.
-" 15U.S.C. § 18(1980).
^" See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 2 1 3, at 478-8 1
.
^'"Id at 478.
'''See id at 481.
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to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition."^'" This exemption was
inserted to exclude from its strict enforcement firms with no intention to acquire the
control over another company by purchasing stock.^'^ However, determining whether the
stock acquisition is solely for the purpose of "investment" is not simple. ^^° The courts rely
on a variety of circumstances for determining the purpose of stock acquisition, trying to
apply objective standard.^^' For instance, the court look to "borrowing at unfavorable
terms to finance large purchases," "speed of acquisition," "presence or absence of
representation on the board of directors."^^^
Many scholars in the United States, depending on the competitive relationship
which existed between parties, classifies mergers into three types: (1) horizontal merger,
(2) vertical merger, and (3) conglomerate merger.^" Horizontal mergers are
consolidations between direct competitor who were manufacturing or distributing same
product or providing same service in the same geographic area.^^^ Horizontal mergers are
normally deemed most hazardous because of their great potential to directly affect the
market structure by reducing the number of direct competitor."' Vertical mergers are
consolidations between firms at different levels of the same industry (upstream and
downstream), such as a merger between a manufacturer and one of its distributor or
-" 15U.S.C. §18(1994).
^" See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213, at 479-80.
^^°
Id.
'^' See Brunner et al, supra note 189, at 80-82.
^" See id.
^'' Danny Abir, Monopoly arid Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 1
3
Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 143, 148 (1996).
^^^ See Brunner et al., supra note 1 89, at 1 6, 1 7.
"' See id
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supplier.^^^ Government enforcement policies toward vertical mergers have been unclear
and have been changed from strict enforcement to wide permission. '^^^ Lastly,
conglomerate mergers may include all type of mergers that are not classified as horizontal
or vertical mergers. In other word, conglomerate mergers are ones other than those which
can be categorized as horizontal or vertical mergers. ^^^ In a conglomerate merger, the
acquiring company is neither potential of actual competitor of the acquired company, nor
is not a supplier of purchaser.^^'
As explained, the Clayton Act, as originally passed, was covering only horizontal
merger, but through its amendment, now its coverage includes both vertical and
conglomerate mergers, thus covering all of the three types of mergers existing."°
Defining the Relevant Market
As in European Community, the market definition is also crucially important in
the United States. """ When determining whether the effect of the merger "may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,""''' the FTC and DOJ,
first of all, have to define properly the relevant product and geographic market.'^^ Until
the DOJ and FTC worked together to develop a more sophisticated approach toward
"''See id. 51-53.
"" See id. 52-53.
""See id at 61-66.
'"** See id.
"^'' See supra text accompanying notes 1 97-99.
*•" Reeves & Blunikin, supra note 213, at 481.
-'- 15U.S.C. 18.
'^' Reeves & Blumkin. supra note 213, at 481-82.
38
39
measuring the relevant market and issued their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,"'*
which refined the analysis presented in the Justice Department's 1982 and 1984 Merger
Guidelines and the FTC's 1982 Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers,"' there was
no unifying principles as to how to define the relevant market, and therefore, most courts
had made inconsistent ruling on the matter of market definition, relying on their
subjective opinion.^'^ Nevertheless, there are several landmark cases with respect to
market definition and these cases have had tremendous influences on later cases and also
have been providing the FTC and DOJ with basis when both agencies issue guidelines.
These are discussed next.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,^^^ the Court stated that "[t]he outer
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of
use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.""*
Since the Court in Brown Shoe stated that "within [a] broad product market, well defined
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes,""^ the courts in the U.S. have been considering the possibility of submarkets
whenever they define a relevant market.^''° The Court in Brown Shoe also introduced
seven "practical indicia"^"*' for determining whether a submarket existed: "industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar
^'"U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552
(Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
"' U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,493 (June 14,
1982); U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 14.
1992).
"^ See Brunneretal., supra note 189, at 83-87.
"'370 U.S. 294(1962).
"'M, at 325 (1962).
-" Id
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characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors. "^"^
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank^'^^ the Court added further
consideration to market defmition.^''^ In this case, although the Supreme Court noticed
that some bank services such as checking accounts are "so distinctive that they are
entirely free of effective competition from products or services of other financial
institution,"^''^ and the Court determined that a "cluster"'''^ of unique and non-unique
services constituting "commercial banking" was a relevant product market.^''^ This case
is also important with regard to geographic market definition. ^''^ The Court noted that the
geographic market is the area of effective competition in which the "seller operates, and
to which the purchaser can practically turn for supplies. "^"^ For geographic market
definition. Courts in the United States have took into account factors such as "consumer
locations, normal pricing patterns, industry recognition, and transportation costs. "''°
Now, the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guideline provides a certain standard about
how to define the relevant market. It should be pointed out that the guideline does not
have legal binding on courts as indicated in several decisions. ^"'^' Rather, as stated by
'"^
Id.
''' Id
''- Id
^'^374 U.S. 321 (1963).
^'^ ABA Anti Trust Section, Monograph No. 12, Horizontal Mergers: Law and Policy 35,36 (1986).
"-374 U.S. at 351-57.
"" Id
''' Id
"' See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213, at 485-86.
"'374 U.S. at 359.
"°See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213, at 485-86.
''' Id
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Brunner,^" the Guideline is "the prevailing standards of the current Administration and
a fair predictor of the questions future Administrations might ask."^'^ Nonetheless, some
courts as well as both antitrust agencies have been following the Guideline's approach on
the matter of defining a relevant market.^''' Under the Guideline, according to Brunner,
"[mjarket definition is a process of identifying firms that, were they to act as a single
entity, could profitably raise and maintain price (a proxy for the exercise of market
power)."'''
In order to define a relevant product market under the Merger Guideline, both the
agencies, FTC and DOJ, will take into account price increase as the most important
factor, and then consider the other factors as ancillary factors that indicate the likely
effect of a price increase.'''^ The Agencies will begin with each products produced or sold
by each merging firms and ask whether a hypothetical monopolist of those products
would be able to impose profitably at least a "small but significant and nontransitory
increase"'^" in price for considerable period, with a condition in which sale of all other
products is remaining still.''* More specifically, the agency, assuming that a hypothetical
monopolist pursues maximum profits in deciding whether to raise the prices of its
products, may ask a hypothetical monopolist who is able to impose "small but significant
^" See supra note 1 89
*" Brunner et al , supra note 1 89, at 13.
'-'
Id. at 88.
-" Id. at 85.
"' 1992 Merger Guidelines, 5w/7ra note 234, § 1(11).
'" Id According to the Guidelines, the "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price will be
five percent, but this can be lager or smaller depending on nature of industry' at issue. Opi, supra note 269-
70.
"' 1992 Merger Guidelines, 5Mjf7r(3 note 234, § 1(11).
42
and nontransitory increase"^^' in price for considerable time period, without losing its
customers to other products or inducing new entry with facilities easily changeable for
supply substitution.^^" If the reduction in sales of the product, as a response to a price
increase, would be large enough that a hypothetical monopolist would not find it
profitable to impose such a price increase, then the Agency will add to the product group
the product that is next-best substitutable for the merging company's product and will ask
the same question again until the Agencies delineate the relevant product market to the
smallest group of products that will satisfy this test.^^'
The Agencies, in considering the likely reaction of the buyers to a price increase,
will take into account all relevant factors including the following four factors:
1) evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases
between products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive
variables;
2) evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer
substitution between products in response to relative changes in price or other
competitive variables;
3) the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output
markets; and
4) the timing and costs of switching products. '*'
=" Id.
'""Id
'"' Id
^" Id
43
This process is also same for geographic market definition. ^^^ For each product market
both Agencies determine the geographic market or markets in which the merging firms
produce or sell.^^" In order to define a relevant geographic market or markets affected by a
merger, the Agencies will begin with the location of each merging firm and ask whether a
hypothetical monopolist of the relevant product would be able to impose profitably
"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, where the terms of sale at
other locations did not change.^^^ This test is based on assumption that buyers who are
purchasing products produced within a location may shift, in response to a price increase,
to purchasing products produced within other locations.^^* If the reduction in sales of the
product at that location would be large enough so that a hypothetical monopolist
producing or selling the relevant product at the merging firm's location would not find it
profitable to impose such an increase in price, then the Agencies will add "the location
fi-om which production is the next-best substitute for production at the merging firm's
location. This process will continue until a group of location is identified such that a
hypothetical monopolist over that group of locations would profitably impose a "small
but significant and nontransitory" increase in price. "^^^
The 1992 Merger Guideline is listing four nonexclusive factors which the DOJ
and FTC will take into account when they consider the likely reaction of buyers in
response to a price increase as follows:
^" See Opi, supra note 14, at 261.
'""Id.
"^
1 992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234, § 1 (2 1 ).
^^ Id.; see also Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 213, at 485-87.
'"'Id
44
1
.
evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases
between different geographic locations in response to relative changes in price
or other competitive variables;
2. evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect ofbuyer
substitution between geographic locations in response to relative changes in
price or other competitive variables;
3. the influence of downstream competition faced by buyer in their output
markets; and
4. the timing and costs of switching supplies.^^^
The 1992 Guidelines do not explicitly refer to other criteria which were listed in the 1984
Guidelines,^^' such as shipment patterns, transportation costs as possible barriers to
shipment into the area, costs of local distribution as possible entry barriers, and excess
capacity by companies outside the location of the merging company. ^^° However, this
does not mean the Agencies do not consider these factors any more, rather the 1 992
Guidelines states that "the Agency will take into account all relevant evidence. "^^'
Market Shares And Concentration
For measuring the level of concentration, the U.S. antitrust authorities have
developed so-called the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (hereinafter HHI) which was
introduced by the 1984 Guidelines. ^^' The 1992 Guidelines is continuously using this
^"^ 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234, § 1(21).
^*' U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26.823 (June 14,
1984).
"° See Opi, supra note 1 4, at 27 1
.
"' Id
"' See Id. at 277.
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method.^^' One of the important characteristics of this test lies in squaring the market
share of each participant in the market in order to give greater weight on the market
power of the larger firms. ^^^ In detail, the Agencies determine the market share of
participant and square them, and finally add the result to measure the concentration
level. ^^' Thus, if a market consists of five firms with market shares of respectively 40%,
26%, 17%, 10%, and 7%, its HHI will be (40 x 40)+(26 x 26)+(17 x 17)+(10 x 10)+
(7 X 7)=2,714. Whether the Agencies will challenge a merger or not depends on both
post-merger market share and the increase in concentration resulting from the merger.^^^
According to the Guidelines, a market with the post-merger less than 1 ,000 is
unlikely to be challenged.^" In other words, those markets will be deemed not to be
concentrated. If the post-merger HHI in a market is between 1,000 and 1,800, the market
will be deemed to be moderately concentrated.'^^ the Agencies are unlikely to challenge a
merger unless an increase in the HHI exceeds 1 00 points because mergers in this
circumstances are considered not to have adverse competitive consequences.^^' However,
if a merger produce an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points in moderately
concentrated markets, the Agencies will take into account several factors set forth from
section 2 to section 5 of the 1992 Guidelines, such as oligopolies, entry barriers,
efficiencies, and the "failing company" defense.'*"
-'- See Id
"* See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 2 1 3. at 488.
''^
1 992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234, § 1(21).
""/J. § 1(51).
''^ Id
''' Id
"" Id
''° Id
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Markets with a post-merger HHI above 1,800 points are deemed to be highly
concentrated.^*' Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 50 points, even in
highly concentrated market, are unlikely to be challenged because they will be considered
not to have adverse competitive consequences in a market.'^*^ If the merger produce £in
increase in HHI of only between 50 and 100 points, the Agencies may challenge,
depending on the related factors.^*^ The Agencies will challenge most mergers that
produce an increase in HHI in excess of 1 00 points, even though related other factors can
overcome this presumption.^*''
Defense And Justification For Mergers
If the net-impact of a merger is pro-competitive, the merger might be given
justification defending on situations.^*^
1
.
Small company doctrine . The Supreme Court once recognized in Brown Shoe
Co. V. United States^^^ that two or more companies might be allowed to merge in order to
compete more effectively with larger, dominant firms in the relevant market. However,
this opinion was rejected in United State v. Von 's Groceryr^^
2. Failing company doctrine . This justification is also contained in the 1992
Merger Guidelines.^** According to the Guidelines, a merger will be deemed to have little
^" Id
''' Id
'" Id
''' Id
^^' These exceptional situation are called defenses because they need to be raised and proved by the
merging parties. Abir, supra note 223, at 151.
'*' 370 U.S. 294.
'''384 U.S. 270(1966)
'*' 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 234, § 5(1).
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possibility to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise if the merger
meet the following conditions:
1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in
the near future;
2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 1 1 of the
Bankruptcy Act;
3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith effort to elicit reasonable alternative
offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would both keep its
tangible and in tangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe
danger to competition than does the proposed merger; and
4) absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant
market.-*^
Procedural Issues
1 . Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Pre-merger Notification. The United States merger
procedure is well provided in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act."''° Most
importantly, this Act requires that mergers and acquisitions with a certain size file a
merger notification forms with the FTC and the DOJ before its consummation.^^' This
pre-merger notification requirement is intended to give a better chance to both agencies
for investigating mergers which may be in violation of the Clayton Act. "^
''' Id
-'" Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 [hereinafter HSR], 15 U.S.C. § 18a
291 See Ah'n, supra note 223. at 150-51.
">' See Id
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The following are two criteria by which it is decided whether or not a merger
should be notified prior to its consummation:
1) At least one of the parties to the merger must do business in of affect interstate
or foreign commerce.^''''
2a) The size of the merging parties must meet one of the three conditions:
the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal $100 million or more and the
acquired party engaged in manufacturing has assets or annual sales equal to
$10 million of more; or
2b) the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal $100 million or more and the
acquired party not engaged in manufacturing has assets equal to 10 million or
more; or
2c) the acquiring party's assets or annual sales equal $10 million or more and the
acquired party have assets or annual sales equal to $100 million or more. This
test can be satisfied without the total acquisition of the assets of the acquired
party.^'''
After the transaction is complete, either the acquiring party will hold an aggregate
total amount of securities and assets of the acquired party totaling $15 million or more in
value, or the acquiring party will hold 15 % or more of the voting securities of the
acquired party. '^'^'^ If the parties to a merger which is subject to a pre-merger notification
consummate the merger without filing the notification forms with both agencies (DOJ
='- 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(l)(1994).
-" 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C)(1994).
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and FTC), they may be subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day, for each day
the violation continues.^'^
The parties to a merger which is subject to the pre-merger notification cannot
complete the merger for a certain period of time. This HSR waiting period is normally 30
days.'^''^ If the reviewing agency ,however, believe that the merger raises doubt as to its
compatibility with the Clayton Act, the agency may issue a formal "request for additional
information" or "second request" prior to the end of the initial waiting period. ^^^ If there
is a second request from the reviewing agency, demanding the parties involved to provide
additional information on the transaction, the waiting period is extended for additional 20
days from the time that all the parties required to be in compliance with the second
request are actually in compliance with the request.'^'^ If the agencies decide to stop the
merger, they must do so within this additional twenty days.'^"" For the cash tender offer,
the initial waiting period is 15 days, and this period is subject to extension of additional
10 days from the time of actual compliance.^*''
At the end of the waiting period, if one of the Antitrust agencies decide to
challenge the merger or acquisition, the reviewing agency seeks a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction in federal district court. ^°" Some transactions with minor
concern may be allowed to proceed if the parties enter into consent decrees with the
'"' 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3)(A)-(C)(1994).
^'MSU.S.C. §18a(gKl)
""^ According to Abir, supra note 223, at 151, even though the waiting period is generally 30 days, failure
to take immediate action against a merger subject to pre-merger notification does not prevent the agencies
form subsequently challenging the merger as a violation of section 7of the Clayton Act.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
'''
Id.
"^Id.
'"' See Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 1 89, at 50 1
.
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agency. ^"^ If the Agencies do not ask the district judge to issue a preliminary injunction
or if the request is dismissed, then the parties to the merger at issue are free to
consummate the merger.^"'* Nevertheless, an action may be brought before an
administrative law judge or before a district court, depending on which agency is dealing
with the case.^°^
Consent Decree
Negotiation resolution in the U.S. merger control system is made through consent
decrees. ^^^ A consent decree has a characteristic of quasi-contractual and also quasi-
judicial because the compromises negotiated between the Department of Justice and the
companies is later ratified as an order of the federal court.^°^
Similar to EU merger settlement, United States often require companies to divest
assets in order to reduce their power in a particular field of market. ^°^ Also, United States
sometimes attain an assurance from acquiring companies that they will continue to do
their business in their relevant markets as independent competitors. ^°^
^°-W. at 501-502..
'°'
Id.
'^ Id.
^°'
1 5 U.S.C. 1 8a(0If the FTC is dealing with the case, the jurisdiction over the case belongs to an
administrative law judge, and if the DOJ is dealing with the case, the jurisdiction belongs to a district court.
Reeves & Blumkin, supra note 2 1 3, at 50 1
.
'°'' Freret, supra note 7, at 168-70.
"' Id
'"' Id
'°' Id
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Remedies
There are basically seven actions that the government can order undertakings. ^'°
These are: (1) injunction against consummation, (2) abandonment, (3) total divestiture,
(4) partial divestiture, (5) mandating aid to competitors, (6) conduct restrictions, and (7)
restrictions on future acquisitions. ""' Each is discussed below:
1) injunction against consummation is issued before the closing date of the
merger, it prohibits consummation of the entire transaction and thus, causing a
"fiill-stop" injunction;^''
2) abandonment of the merger usually takes place when there is a government
announcement of intent to sue;""^
3) total divestiture is the most common remedy ordered by the government if the
merger has closed. (It takes one of three forms: (a) rescission—although it is
rarely ordered by the courts due to its punitive effects, it involved the acquired
business being resold to its former owners; (b) spinoff—the acquired business
is made an independent company with its stock distributed to the shareholders
of the acquirer and management is separated; and (c) sale to a third party
—
most divestiture are by sale of assets to a third party;
4) partial divestiture is achieved by selling off a subsidiary or division;^'''
5) remedies have included mandating aid to competitors ordering provisions to
create or strengthen competitor of the merged firm. It may involve ordering
'" See generally, Brunner et al , supra note 1 89, at 1 89-203.
'''See Id
'''See Id.
''' See id
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the buyer to help a rival company by providing new firm forms, customer
lists, and related supplies;^'^
6) conduct restrictions in lieu of divestiture is also favored by the government. It
restricts the conduct of would-be parties by prohibiting common management,
limiting exchange of information, and placing rules about sales to each
other;"'
7) when the government deems that it cannot win divestiture, it settles for an
order restricting future acquisitions. (One of the three measures is ordered: (a)
blanket prohibition is a flat ban on acquisition for a period of years. It is
rarely used presently due to its unduly restrictive effects; (b) companies are
required to get a prior approval from the government. The government
usually puts a ten-year restraint on fiiture acquisitions; and (c) sometimes the
government requires a notice of a future transactions that is not reported under
Penalties . These remedies are strictly enforced and compliance to orders is
expected.'"'' When the DOJ initiates an action, it may institute a criminal action to
impose a fine or imprisonment for violation of the monopoly laws or if there is a per se
violation.^'" Corporations may be fined up to $ 1 million for violation of the Sherman
.A.ct. Likewise, individuals may be fined up to $100,000 and/or imprisonment for up to
'''See Id.
'''See Id.
j;7
'' 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
'" 5ee Brunneretal, supra note 189. at 189-203..
'''See Id
''° See Id
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three years."' In addition, violations of the FTC's order are punishable by fines up to
$10,000 per offense, or per day for each day of the continuing offense, and, even resulting
in imprisonment."^
"' See Id.
'"- See Id.
CHAPTER IV
SOUTH KOREA
Background Of Implementing The Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act
The anti-merger provision of South Korea is found in the Monopoly Regulation
and Fair Trade Act.^^' Especially, the Chapter 3 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair
Trade Act is providing whole provisions for the merger regulation in the Act. As a series
of mergers by conglomerates in Korea have been causing a significant economic
concentration in the Korea market, the "Merger Regulation and Fair Trade Act'* in 1981
.
the Korean Antitrust Act, was enacted against the economic concentration.^"'* In this
Section, a brief history of implementing the MRFT Act will be introduced, and in
addition, a brief report about merger practice in Korea will be provided.
Historical Overview
From the 1 970s, new social and economic problem began to appear in South
Korea as anti-competitive behaviors of business entities, such as aggravation of
monopolization and generalization of various type of trust and unfair trade practice, was
being spread and accepted in common sense among people as well as business bodies. ^^^
^-' The official title of this Act is "Dok-Jum-Kyu-Je Mit Kong-Jeong-Keo-Rae- Eh Kwan-Han Boep-Ryul"
[Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], promulgated by Law No. 3320 (Dec. 31, 1980), codified as
amended by Law No.4831 (Dec. 23, 1994). [hereinafter MRFT Act].
^^ See Seung Wha Chang, A Probabilistic Approach to Multi-market Mergers: Proposed Merger Policy
against Economic C concentration Under the Korean Antitrust Act and Section "^ ofthe U.S. Clayton Act.
32 COLUM. J. Transnafl L. 43, 43-44 (1994).
''' See Id
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This chaotic economic situation forced the Korean Government to enact the MRFT Act
with the purpose of (1) stimulating fair competition among business groups,
(2) protecting customers, and (3) accomplishing well-balanced national economic
growth. ""^^ Until the seventies, the Government had tried to maximize economic scale by
supporting the largest groups politically and financially.''"^ However, while the largest
groups were enlarging their business scales with monopoly power, middle-sized and
small-sized firms were being seriously threatened to be expelled from the market."^
Also, the market was becoming more and more concentrated, and the number of
anti-competitive practices including monopolization and unfair trust was increasing
rapidly each year, along with increment of unfair trade behaviors. ^"'^ Under these
dynamic circumstances, the Korean Government came to enact the MRFT Act in the
hope of correcting unfair business practice and stimulating fair competition in the
market.""
The Article 7 of the MRFT Act. especially, is the anti-merger provision very
similar to the Section 7 of the Clayton Act of the United States."' In fact, the Article 7 of
the MRFT Act was modeled after the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and as a
result, the key languages in both anti-merger statutes are quite similar.^^^ For instance,
like the Section 7 of the Clayton Act. the Section 7 of the MRFT Act is supposed to
prohibit an>' mergers of which the effect ''may substantially lessen competition in the
'-" See id
''' See id
'-" See id
'-" See id
"" See id
'""
15 U.S.C. §18(1988)
^"'- Chang, supra note 324, at 43-44.
particular field of trade."''" Therefore, the Korean MRFT Act also, like the Clayton
Act, is authorizing the right to interfere even where there is only possibility of anti-
competitive effect without any actual negative effect on the market."'*
One of the outstanding point about the MRFT Act is the fact that the bill
introducing MRFT Act was proposed in 1 980 by the executive branch rather than the
legislature. At that time, Korea was experiencing the transition from Fourth to Fifth
Republics, and the Korea Assembly (Congress) was in temporary suspension. The
"National Security Legislation Conference"' was elected as an interim authority of the
Korea Assembly. During replacement period, this National Security Legislation
Conference passed several bills, and MRFT Act is one of them."^
Merger Practices in South Korea
Even though. South Korea has essentially similar merger regulation as that of the
United States, the application of the regulations have shown quite different aspect owing
to the differences in their own respective economic circumstances and government
policies."^ This section will provide a brief picture of merger practice in South Korea
until 1990."'
Informally, the Korean economy is sometimes called chaebol economy due to the
large economy sector controlled by a few number of conglomerates called "chaebol.'"
Chaebol is officially called "Ki-Up-Jip-Dhan", and both words represent "business
56
"^ MRFT Act, supra note 323. art. 7(1).
"* Chang, supra note 324, at 44.
'" Byung-bae Kim, Easy Fair Tr.ade (Al-Ki-Shi-Un Kong-Jung-Ge-Rac) 44.45 (1996).
"* See Abir, supra note 223, at 158-59.
"' See Id.
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conglomerates."''"'^ These select conglomerates are composed of several specialized
companies which are interrelated closely with each other. Although the subordinate
companies, in most cases, appear to operate independently as a matter of law, they form
interdependence by supporting and servicing each other financially and technically."'
In South Korea, the economic concentration is closely connected to the growth of
the chaebols' economic power.^^" The Korea economy history reveals that the
conglomerates, while trying to accomplish diversification, aggravated the economic
concentration in the market.^^' Until the 1970s, most corporations tried to enlarge their
business sizes by focusing on internal growth, and as a result, almost all markets began to
be dominated by these minority number of enlarged corporations.
However, after the 1970s, the situation changed dramatically. It was no longer
possible to enlarge the business scale by just relying on internal growth because all
markets were already occupied by a few corporations with a dominant position.'''*'
Corporations were not left any choice but to merge with other corporation.^"*^ With this
change, the corporations with dominant position began to trying to expand their business
lines by merging and acquiring other corporations, and thus, became huge economic
"* See Chang, supra note 324, at 48.
"' Most criticism concerning chaebol economy is about their executive bodies. Originally, most of the
chaebol evolved from a family business and they are still remaining under the control of the family
members of the one who created the business. In other world, these family members are occupying the core
executive position and possessing a strong power to have decisive influence on business decisions. Jd
'"' Id
'" Id at 48-57.
"= Id
"' Id
58
entities with several number of affiliates. The new generation of chaebols created in this
background has seriously contributed to economic concentration in Korea.^'*''
There were 2,003 mergers reported to the Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter
KFTC) between 1 98 1 and 1 990, but among these, only two mergers were challenged by
the Korean government.'*''^ Furthermore, even these two cases were settled down without
being brought to the merging firms, as they accepted the administrative order as a matter
of negotiation.^'*'' To make it worse, large portion of mergers accomplished by large-scale
business entities were executed for the sole purpose of establishing diversification rather
than structure rationalization or to strengthen competition.^''^ Furthermore, most of the
target firms were companies not belonging to any other chaebol, as a result, in most
cases, only small independent businesses were sacrificed. ''^^
During all this time, the Korea government, in the effort of establishing large size
of economic scale and strengthen international competitiveness in the foreign market, had
a policy jQot to challenge mergers.'*'''^
Jurisdictional Scope
Due to the lack of any legislative record of decisions by the Korea court, it is
necessary' to closely examine the statute itself, in this case, to figure out the legislative
"^
Id.
"- Id. at 55-56.
"' Two cases are: ( 1 ) Dong-Yang Chemical, 82- 1 . January 13.1 982, 1 982 MRFT Act Decision) and (2)
Song-won lndustr\. 82-24, December 15, 1982, 1982 MRFT Act Decision),
'"^ Among the mergers accomplished between 1981 and 1990, more than 32% of the mergers were
accomplished for the sole purpose of diversification, 17.1°o for the purpose of rationalization of financial
structures and rationalization of production and marketing, and 8.2° o for acquiring failing firms. Chang,
supra note, at 57.
''' Id
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intention. The Article 7 of the MRFT Act prohibits two types of combination."" The
first type is a combination which may resuU in restricting competition in the market That
is, any corporation that meets the paid-in capital or whole asset threshold set in the
enforcement decree is prohibited from engaging in any activity when there is likely to a
substantial restriction of competition in ''particular field of trade.""' The statute, in the
same Article, is listing those prohibited activities as follows:
1) acquiring or owning shares of another corporation;
2) allowing an office or an employee to concurrently hold a position as an office
of another corporation;
3) merging with another corporation;
4) taking over or leasing the whole or a substantial part of the business or
undertaking the management of another corporation, or taking over the whole
or substantial part o the fixed assets used for the business of another
corporation; and
5) participating in the establishment of a new corporation."'
The second type is combinations which are accomplished through compulsion or
unfair method. The Act provide that, regardless the size of the corporate, this kind of
combinations are strictly forbidden by the Act."^
»"
Id.
^"° MRFT Act. supra note 323. art 7.
'^' Id
''' Id
353 Id art. 7(3).
J
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Thus, the statute is expressly showing that the regulation will be applied to
mergers with a certain size as in the European Community."^ The Article 1 1 of the
president decree for the MRFT Act, as amended in Feb. 1993, require that the merger
regulations only apply to corporations with paid-in capital of more than 5 billion won or
with whole assets of 20 billion won.^"
The words "particular field of trade""* is similar to the United States' definition of a
relevant market which is "in any line of commerce or in any activity commerce in any
section of the country,"''" and has a meaning of a relevant market including both the
relevant product and geographic market."^
Defense and Justifications for Combinations
Mergers and acquisitions have been playing important roles in the Korea economy
history and have been catalysts in accomplishing a considerably large scale of the
economy."' As a result, the Korean government has the tendency not to intensely
challenge mergers when the effects of mergers are especially not highly dangerous to the
market. '*^*' This tendency is much more apparent when the mergers only involve small-
and medium-sized firms. ^*'
'''' See supra text accompanying notes 55.
'" the official title of this enforcement decree is "Ki-Up-Kyol-Hap-Eh Kwan-Han Beop-Yul-Si-Hang-
Ryong [hereinafter MRFT Act Decree] (Sept. 2, 1981).
"* MRFT Act, supra note 323, art. 7.
^" 15U.S.C. § 18(1994).
^^* Abir, supra note 223, at 155-56.
"'Mat 157.
'""Id.
''' Id
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According to the MRFT Act, the Commission is allowed to give permission to
certain combinations when they have the purpose of achieving industrial rationalization
or strengthening international competitiveness specified in the MRFT Act Decree. ""^'^ The
burden of proving the need to rationalize the industry or strengthen international
competitiveness lies on the enterprises seeking the combination in question.''"
Compatibility Test
For a compatibility test of a merger, the KFTC will take into account several
factors. ^^^ However, as in the United States, this test may be somehow different,
depending on whether the merger is horizontal, vertical or conglomerate because, for
example in case of a horizontal merger, there will a explicit anti-competition effect due to
the reduced competitor in the same market."*^^
^^" MRFT Act art. 7( 1 ). MRFT Act Decree is providing detail conditions for this kind of defense.
According to the article, business combinations for "industry' rationalization" shall be permitted only when
the conditions set forth in any one of the following subparagraphs are met:
1
.
when restructuring the industrial organization is critical for enhancing the efficiency of industrial
activities and the rationalization of management;
2. where investment in facilities and operations requires substantial funds, and procurement of such funds
is impossible through normal means; or
3. where a business combination is necessary for the public interest. MRFT Act Decree, supra note 355,
art. 13.
Article 14 set forth conditions for the justification of "strengthening international competitiveness":
1. where international competitiveness can be significantly improved in terms of price and quality by
means of accelerating technological development, attaining optional scales for management, and the
like; or
2. where a substantial contribution can be made to the increase of exports by accelerating business
activities in overseas markets, such as collecting information, marketing, and sales. Id. art 14.
'"' MRFT Act, supra note 323, art. 7(2).
'"^ See Abir, supra note 223, at 1 57-78.
'" See KiM, supra note 335, at 280-28 1
.
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In general, the Korean Merger Regulation is applied not only where there is a
actual dominant position but also where there is a possibility of creating a dominant
position.^^^ The MRFT Act provides that any combination should be considered to be
substantially restraining competition in a particular market if the combination fall into
one of the following categories:
1
)
The total market share of the parties to the business combination meets the
criteria of a market-dominant enterprise and is the highest in the particular
market, and also the difference between the total market share and the market
share of the corporation with the second highest market share is more than
25% of the sum of the market share.
2) At least one of the parties to the merger is one of the large-scale corporations
listed by the Commission and the business combination at issue takes place in
a market in which the market share of the small-and-medium enterprises is
more than two-thirds. And also, the parties to the combination acquire more
than 5% of the market share as a result of the business combination. ^^^
For the horizontal merger compatibility test, the KFTC will take into account
following factors:
a) market share and market concentration before and after the merger;
b) existence of new technology or new product which might have potential
ability to change the market structure;
'""Id.
'" MRFT Act, supra note 323, art 7(4).
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c) the financial condition of the concerned parties;
d) threatening from abroad (import and export situation, custom, etc.);
e) market entry barrier to a new participant; and
f) substitutabiHty of the concerned product. "'^^
The Korean Merger Guidehnes also provides a 3-step test:
1) First, there must be newly formed command-acceptance relationship between
the merging parties after the merger.
2) Second, those merging parties must be in a competitive relationship or in a
supplier-consumer relationship for the resource material.
3) Third, there must be a dominant position formed due to the newly formed
command-acceptance relationship. ^^^
In any case, the first step for the compatibility test is comparing the market share
and market concentration. The HHI Index is often used for the market concentration
analysis."*™ However, if the same measure used in the United States is applied to mergers
in Korea, too many different types of products such as milk, electric washer, auto, gas,
and telecommunication will be belonging to a highly concentrated market in which the
post-merger HHI is over 1,800."' More sophisticated study on this matter is required for
both KFTC and business entities in respect of predictability.
^** Id. These Factors are also important factors to be taken into consideration in case of vertical and
conglomerate mergers. Abir, supra note 223. at 157.
'"' Kim, supra note 335. at 281-83.
"° See Id.
"' See id.
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Procedural Aspects
Filirm of Report
The MRFT Act requires corporations which meet the conditions set forth in its
Article 12 to notify the KFTC of mergers and acquisition transactions, thereby allowing
the Commission the opportunity to examine combinations which may have anti-
competitive impact on a particular market/^^ The reporting requirement is only applied
to corporations whose total amount of assets or revenues (meaning the sum of the total
amount of assets of revenues of affiliates) meet the criteria set forth in the enforcement
Decree, and the Article 18 of the enforcement Decree provides the total assets or sales
revenue exceeding 1 00 billion won.^^^
For corporations with such a dimension as described above, the combination must
notify the Commission:
a) when the acquiring corporation owns more than twenty percent (or more than
15 percent for listed corporations by the Commission) of the total number of
shares issued by the acquired corporation;
b) when an officer or an employee of a corporation concurrently holds the
position of officer of another corporation;
c) a corporation intends to merge with another corporation, takes over another
corporation, or establish a new corporation; or
"- MRFT Act, supra note 323, atl. 12.
'''Id. art. 12(1).
65
d) when a corporation subscribes to twenty percent pr more of the shares of a
374
new corporation to be established.
The MRFT Act applies different reporting period for the combinations by large
size or market-dominant corporations."' In general, a reporting for business combination
must be filed within 30 days after the date of execution of a business combination.
However, provided the case involves mergers, takeovers, or the establishment of new
firms, and if one or more corporations in the combination is a large corporation or a
market-dominant Enterprise, the combination must be reported within 30 days after the
date of execution of a merger agreement of a business transfer agreement or the date of
adoption of a resolution at a shareholders meeting concerning participation in the
establishment of a corporation."^
Once an enterprise has filed a report to the KFTC, it cannot register a merger,
perform the obligations under the business transfer agreement, or subscribe to shares
within 30 days. The Commission may, if it deems it necessary, shorten this period or
extend up to 60 days."^
The KFTC can request from merger parties any documents necessary for its
investigations."** If the parties to a combination required to file a report to KFTC fail to
""M art. 12(1).
" MRFT ACT requires that the Fair Trade Commission, once a year, designate market-dominant
enterprises, and also according to Article 14 the commission is required to designate large business groups.
Id. art. 4.
^'^
Id. art. 12(4).
"'/c/. art. 12(5).
"* Id art. 4(2).
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do this or provide a false report, it is punishable by a fine up to 100 million won/^'^
Also, if a corporation has been established or companies have been merged in violation of
Article 7 or without filing report or observing the waiting period, the Commission may
file a lawsuit to nullify the business combination at issue. ^^°
Other than large-scale enterprises or market-dominant enterprises, corporations
wishing to establish business combinations may petition the Commission for a pre-
merger examination as to whether the business combination has the effect of substantially
restraining competition, and the Commission, after receiving a request for a pre-merger
examination, shall notify the petitioner of the result within 30 days. The Commission
may extend this period up to 60 days if it deems it necessary.^*'
Remedies
For the companies which have violated or are likely to violate the merger
regulations, the first step the KFTC may opt to take is issuing corrective measures against
those companies. ''^' The KFTC may order "prohibition of such act in violation,"
"disposition of an officer," "resignation of an officer," "transfer of business,"
"cancellation of debt guarantees," "public announcement of the violation," or "other
corrective measures necessary to correct the violation of law. "^^^
Any party who is dissatisfied with any measures taken by the Fair Trade
Commission can file an appeal with the Fair Trade Commission within 30 days from
'"Id. an. 68(2)
^Ud art. 16(2)
*' Id art. 12(6)
*' Id art. 16(1)
*' Id art. 16(1)
the opportunity to state their opinions. Id. art. 52.
The Fair Trade Commission must provide opportunity' the parties or interested parties with
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receiving the measures at issue. "'^'^ The Fair Trade Commission has 30 days until it
reaches a decision concerning the appeal, but the period is extendible up to 30 days under
unavoidable circumstances.^^'
If any party which filed an appeal with the KFTC still wants to file a lawsuit with
respect to the measures taken by the Commission, it will do so within 30 days from
receiving the judgment on the its appeal. ^*^ In this case, the whole jurisdiction exclusively
belongs to the Seoul High Court.^^^
If a combination already has been accomplished in violation of article 7 or
without filing a report, the KFTC may file a lawsuit to nullify the combination. ''^^ In other
words, unlawful combinations of companies are not deemed to be null and void until
there is a final and conclusive court decisions nullifying those combinations.
Penalties . There is also penal provisions in the MRFT Act.^*^ The violation of the
regulation may result in a fine up to two million won and three years in jail for any
person who violated it.^^'' According to Article 66, the prison sentence and fine may be
imposed concurrently.^*^' Also, the KFTC may impose surcharge for companies in
violation of the regulations.^^' The amount of surcharge will vary depending on the
provision violated, the type of the combination and the amount of transaction.^^'
"'/J. art. 53(1).
''' Id art. 53(2).
''' Id art. 54.
"'/a', art. 55.
"VJ. art. 16(2).
'" Article 66 through 71 is dealing with penal sanctions. Id. arts. 66-71.
'^Z^. art. 66(1).
"' Id art. 66(2).
'"'Id an. 17.
''' Id
CHAPTER V
JAPAN
Background: The Antimonopoly Act of Japan
Chapter 4 of the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter AMA) is devoted to the merger
regulation.^^" The following content in this section of the article is background of
implementing of the AMA Act.
Before the Second World War, there was not any anti-monopoly law in Japan.
Even the term "fair competition" was not receiving any attention from the business
world.^^^ Economic development was achieved under government's strong interference
and guidance, the concern of the Japanese government did not lie on fair competition nor
balanced development of industries. "^"^^
At this time, the Japanese economy was suffering from economic concentration
by many large industrial combines called "zaibatsu."^^^ They were large industrial
conglomerate composed of many companies engaged in various industries controlled by a
head company and linked through mutual stock holding and interlocking directories.^''* As
the economic problem caused by "zaibatsu'". the Japanese government changed its
"^ The official title of the Act is "Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of 14 April 1947).
"' See MiTSUo Matsushita. International Trade Competition Law in Japan 76 (1993).
'"' See id
'"' See id
"^ See id
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attitude drastically and established its goal on the economic democratization and
deconcentration. The AMA was the first tool for this new government policy. ^^'
The original AMA was enacted in 1947. Generally speaking, the original AML
Act was modeled after United States Antitrust law. the original AMA imposed stringent
controls over mergers and acquisitions, strictly prohibited cartels among firms in
competitive relationship, prohibited undue imbalance in business power, and allowed
severely narrow exemptions. ''^^ Thus, the main concern of the AML Act was a structural
control rather than prohibiting specific conduct of the enterprises.'*'^'
In 1953, the Japanese Government relaxed AMA enforcement through
amendment of the Act after realizing that too much stringent enforcement is not any
beneficial to the economy after the war."""^ The amendment relaxed and changed the per
se prohibition against cartels to a prohibition against substantial cartels, relaxed the
provisions regulating mergers and acquisitions, and abolished the prohibited prohibition
of undue imbalance in economic power.''°^
The AMA was once again amended in 1977. The amendment of 1977 is
significant because it was the first amendment which strengthened its enforcement. The
amendment introduced ''control of monopolistic situation" to the Act for "structure
control," also introduced price reporting system whereby the Fair Trade Commission
could apply prohibition to a price cartel agreement. '*°^
''^ See Id. at 76-78.
'"^ See Id. at 78-79.
''' See Id
""' Id at 79-81.
''' Id
'''' Id at 82-84.
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The current AMA regulates a broad range of business activities. The Act
prohibits cartels with certain exceptions and private monopolization and unreasonable
restraints on trade. The Act restricts holding companies, stockholdings, interlocking
directories, and merger and acquisitions which may substantially restrain fair competition
in a market. Also, the Act prohibits international agreement or contract in restraint of
trade, and prohibits unfair business practices. ''°'
The AMA also created the Fair Trade Commission which is the enforcement
agency of the AMA provisions. The Fair Trade Commission is given a wide scope of
power to investigate, hold hearing, and decide whether the act in question violates the
AMA.'*"^ The Fair Trade Commission can issue an administrative order commanding a
party in violation of the AMA to cease or make some correction to the conduct in
violation of the Act."*"^
Jurisdictional Scope
Provisions in Chapter 4 of the AMA are providing measures which is, in general,
specifically designed to prevent concentration of economic power by few large
enterprises.''^^ Articles 9, 9(2) and 1 1 are provisions for the control of a general
concentration of economic power, and the other articles in the same chapter have
provisions for the control of a specific concentration of economic power.""' For example,
'°' Id at 86-89.
^°' Id at 98-1 10.
'°' Id
'°' See Abir, supra note 290, at 168-69.
'*°^ The title of Article 9 is "prohibition of holding compan\ ," the one of .Article 9.2 is "restriction on total
amount of stockholding by a giant non-financial company," and the title of Article 1 1 is "restriction on
stockholding rate by a financial company." AMA, supra note 394, arts. 9-1 i.
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Article 10 is dealing with stock acquisition. Article 13 prohibits the interlocking
directories, Article 14 prohibits an acquisition of stocks by a person other than a company
if this tends to substantially restrain competition in a market, and Article 15 is devoted to
mergers.
Prohibition of Holding Companies
Article 9 of the AMA prohibits any holding companies which is, according to
Article 9(2), a company whose major business is to hold stocks of other companies and to
control them/'" Under the Article 9, it does not matter whether the holding company in
question causes an anti-competitive impact in a particular filed of market or not/" In
other words, this provision is applicable as long as a company exist as a form of holding
company/'^ On the contrary, as far as a company continue to carry out its own business,
this company does come under the range of Article 9 even when the company controls
another company by means of stockholding/'^
The reason for this strict prohibition can be traced back to legislative history.
Before the enactment ofAMA, Japanese economy was suffering from economy
domination by the "zeibatsu" combinations in which a holding company controlled stocks
of various companies which belonged to the same group.''"' One of the legislative purpose
of the AMA was strict prohibition of resurrection of the "zeibatsu" combinations and the
legislative body thought that they can achieve this goal by controlling formation of
*^° See Matsushita, supra note 395, at 124-25 (1993).
*'''SeeId.
''-
Id.
*'' Id
''' Id
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holding companies at an early stage/'' Therefore, the Article 9(2)(1 ) is regarded as a
preliminary preventive measure. However, there have been criticism about this provision
because the Article 9 prohibits any holding companies even when they do not create any
anti-competitive effect in a market.'"^
Quantitative Limitation of Stock-Holding
Article 9(2)(1) prohibits any large company engaged in business other than
financial services from holding stocks of another company above the value of its own
capital, or its net worth, whichever is greater/'^ Here, a large company is one whose
capital is larger than 10 billion yen or whose net assets are larger than 30 billion yen/'*
Article 1 1 provides a maximum limit of stockholding for financial institutions which are
exception from application of Article 9(2)/''^ According to the Article, these financial
institutions are prohibited from acquiring or holding stock of another company in excess
of 5% of the total outstanding stock of unless there is a permission from the Fair Trade
Commission of Japan/^''
Acquisition and Holding of Stocks
Under Article 10(1), the acquisition of stocks is unlawful if, as the result of stocks
by one company of another company, competition in a market may be substantially
restrain, or if the acquisition of stocks is accomplished through unfair trade pratices/"'
Ud.
'Id.
^ AMA, 5Mpra note 394, Art 9.2(1).
'Id
'' Financial Companies refer to one engaged in banking, trust, insurance, business securities. Id
'-" /J. art 1 1
.
""'
Id. art. 1 0( 1 ). This Article is dealing with a situation in which a company acquires stocks of another
company, thereby controlling the other company, but each company remains a separate company. Id
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Acquisition and Holdinu of Stocks
Under Article 10(1), the acquisition of stocks is unlawful if. as the result of stocks
by one company of another company, competition in a market may be substantially
restrain, or if the acquisition of stocks is accomplished through unfair trade pratices/^'
As to the issue of how much stock holding by a acquiring company is necessary to
be deemed to have control over the acquired company, the Fair Trade Commission, in
1981, issued guidelines called ''Standards for Examination of Stockholding by
Companies. '"*'' According to the guidelines, it is deemed that there is control if: (1) stocks
of another company reach more than 50% of a company's otstanding stocks; (2) the
acquired company amounts to a "related company" which is a corporate entity whose
outstanding stocks are owned by another corporate entity by 20% or more; (3) the
acquiring company holds more than 25% of the outstnading stocks of the acquired
company; (4) if the acquiring company holds more than 10% but less than 25 % of the
outstanding stocks of the acquired company and the acquired company is the first-
rankiing shareholder, or the acquiring company and the acquired companies are in a
competitive relationshiop; or (5) companies jointly hold stocks of another company in the
form of a joint venture and the holding companies are in a competitive relationship.""
Article 10 uses the words "may be" in the provision."''"' This means that the
regulation is authorizing the Fair Trade Commission to be able to block a merger in its
*'
Id. art. 10(1 ). This Article is dealing with a situation in which a compan\ acquires stocks of another
company, thereby controlling the other compan\. but each compan\ remains a separate company. Id.
^^^ See Matshishita, supra note 395, at 126.
*^'
Id. at 127.
'-' AMA. jsupra note 394, art. 10(1).
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tends to be substantially restrained or if the merger is carried out through an unfair
business practice/^^
As in the Article 10(1) for stock acquisition, the Article 15(1) also has the term
"may be," thereby implying that the Article 15(1) is applicable even if competition in a
market is not restrained but there is a likelihood that competition will be in danger by the
merger in question/'^
The Fair Trade Commission issued the guidelines for the merger regulation in
1980 to help in deciding whether to proceed against a merger or not/^^ According to the
guidelines, if the value of the total assets of each of the companies intending to
consummate a merger is 5 billion yen or less, generally, there is not any examination
about the substance of the merger/^'^ This enforcement policy can be traced back to the
Japanese Government's intention to protect mergers consummated between small
companies/^''
On the contrary, a merger will be closely examined if: (1) the market share of one
of the companies intending to effect a merge or the aggregate of the market shares of both
companies together is 25% or above; (2) one or both of the companies ranks first in
market share and the difference between the top ranking and lower ranking companies in
terms of market is great; (3) the ranking in market share of one or both of the merging
companies is within the top three and the aggregate of the market shares of these three
''" /J. at 127-28
''' Id
'''* Id the merger guideline is entitled 'Administrative Procedure Standards for Examining Mergers, etc. by
Companies.' in this guidelines, some general tests are announced and mergers are classified into horizontal
mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate mergers. Id.
"''
Id. Therefore, the Fair Trade Commission will only examine whether or not the parties are fulfilling the
reporting requirement of Article 15(2). Id.
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amounts to 50% or above; (4) the number of competitions in the market in which one of
the merging companies belongs is small; or (5) the total assets of one of the merging
companies is above 10 billion yen and those of the other company is 10 billion yen or
431
more.
Relevant Market Definition
The term "particular field of Trade" used in the merger regulation refers to the
relevant market including both product and geographical market/" It is necessary also in
AMA to determine a market in which ant-competitive conduct occurs.
For the product market definition, the most important criterion considered by the
Fair Trade Commission is substitutability of products or services/" For the geographic
market definition, there is no standard to be applied uniformly to every case. However,
when the Fair Trade Commission issued the guidelines on mergers and acquisitions in the
retail business, the Fair Trade Commission announce that the administrative boundaries
of a city would be considered as a geographic market in retail business except for the six
large cities for the purpose of reviewing mergers and acquisitions.''^''
''' Id
"'' Id at 128-29.
*^' Matsushita, supra note 395, at 92-3.
^" Id
"" Id. the official title of the Guidelines is "On Mergers and Acquisitions in Retail Business"(1981). Id.
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Procedural Issues
Filing Requirement
There are different filing requirements in each provision for different types of
concentration of economic power. For instance. Article 10 provides filing requirement for
stockholding by a company, Article 12 for interlocking directories. Article 14 for
stockholding by a person other than a company, and Article 1 5 provides for filing
requirement for mergers.
According to the Article 15, every company in Japan which intends to be involved
in a merger, regardless of its size, must file a notification with the Fair Trade
Commission.''^^ Also, those companies which filed notifications with the Commission
cannot effect their merger within 30 days from the date of complete filing."*^^ This waiting
period may be shortened, or extended up to sixty days, when the Commission deems it
necessary .''^' During this waiting period, the Commission will examine whether or not the
merger at issue is in violation. "^^
There are penalties against failure to file notifications. Failure to notify with the
Commission is punishable by a fine up to two million yen.'*'*'' For companies which effect
mergers without filing notification or without observing the waiting period, the Fair
Trade Commission may bring a suit to nullify the mergers at issue.^""
''' AMA, supra note 394. art. 15(2).
"'^Mart 15(3)
*'''
Id. It is also required that the Commission acquire the consent of the companies concerned when it
changes the waiting period. Id.
^" Matsushita, supra note 395, at 129.
"" AMA, supra note 394, art 12.
*'°/c/. art. 18.
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If the Fair Trade Commission finds sufficient reason to suspect that the business
combination at issue violates the merger regulation, the Fair Trade Commission either
recommends the parties concerned to take corrective measures or initiate the formal
hearing proceeding/'"
Article 1 8 provides corrective measures for business combination. For instance,
the Fair Trade Commission recommend the parties concerned to dispose the whole or part
of the stocks, to transfer a part of his business, to resign from his position as an officer in
a company/''^ Furthermore, besides the measures introduced above, the Fair Trade
Commission may take any other measures to eliminate the act in violations of the
regulation/'*^ If the parties accept the recommendation, the Fair Trade Commission
renders a decision without initiating a hearing procedure."'*'*
After a hearing procedure, the Fair Trade Commission may order the concerned
parties to take corrective measures provided in the Article 1 7(2) or clear the act in
question. If the parties is going to file a suit against the decision by the Commission, they
must do that within thirty days from the date which the decision became effective.'*"^ The
jurisdiction of the cases belong to the Tokyo High Court.'*'*^ There is no mention of the
fate of an unchallenged unlawful combination. It seems that such combinations remain as
long as there is no challenge against those combinations, as is the case in South Korea.""^
"' Id. art. 48.
^~ Id. art. 1 7(2)
''' Id
^' Id art. 48(4).
^' Id art. 77.
"'"/J. art. 85.
447
Abir, supra note 290, at 171.
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Penalties . There is also penal provisions. Any act in violation of the merger and
acquisition provisions is punishable by fine up to 2 mission yen, one year of
imprisonment or both.^^* The AML provides standing to bring suit for private parties
injured as a result of a violation of the regulation."''^ While the United States provides for
treble damages, the damages in Japan is limited to the actual damages.'''^
"** AMA, supra note 394, art 9 1
.
"' Abir, supra note 290, at 1 7 1
.
450
Id.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This chapter is devoted to comparative analysis of merger regulations which were
examined in the previous chapter and to concluding remarks. The comparison will be
mainly focused on the EC and U.S. system not only because they have well developed
and considerably sophisticated regulations but also because both countries have been
more active in applying their regulations, thereby controlling market concentration
caused by merger and acquisition.
EU competition law which is based on Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, and
Korea MRFT Act, and Japan AMA. all of them were directly influenced by the U.S.
antitrust law.'*^' However, depending on their differing purpose, they evolved into having
different rules and different interpretation of the regulation. For example, in applying the
rules, some social and political values has played less important role in a United States
competition analysis than in a EU competition analysis, and we may find the reason from
the fact that the main concern of the U.S. antitrust law lied more on pure competition
while the primar\' purpose of the EU competition law was market integration rather than
pure competition.^'' In Korea and Japan, the governments main concerns were to build up
competitiveness of their industries rather than strictly controlling market concentration
"•
' Abir, supra note 306, at 143-44.
*-' Freret, supra note 7. at 144-45.
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and fair competition/''' From these discrepancy, the appHcation and interpretation of
merger regulation also have diverged.
The methods of measuring market concentrations are different, even though they
are all basically based on the market shares of the companies in a market. The U.S.
Agencies seem to rely more on economic tools that the agencies of the other countries do.
In European Community's experience, the lack of clear and objective analytical criteria
has led to legal uncertainty in the Commission's decision as well as court's decision and
have been criticized by scholars.'^'^
There is a big difference in the power of enforcement agencies. In United States,
when the FTC and the DOJ is going to block a merger, they have to proceed in the court,
seeking the a court decision.^'' The EC Commission, in contrast to the U.S. agencies,
need not proceed in court to block a merger."'^ Korea Fair Trade Commission and Japan
Fair Trade Commission also render a decision and order the concerned parties to take
corrective measures provided in their regulations.^" Nevertheless, for some mergers such
as ones which failed to notify prior to the consummation or which filed wrong
information. Those agencies of both countries have to file an action to nullify the mergers
at issue."''^ On the contrary, even if a company has already implemented a merger without
a pre-notification of their intention to merge, the European Commission has power to
^'' See supra text accompanying notes 359-61, 394-407.
"'' Opi, supra note 14, at 274-280.
"'^ See supra text accompanying notes 302-5.
'^*' See supra text accompanying notes 1 59-64.
*" See supra text accompanying notes 382-84, 442-444.
""* Sec supra text accompanying notes 380, 384.
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require the post-merger company to be separated or has the power to take any
appropriate measure necessary to restore the competition/^^
The EC Commission investigate only concentrations which were informed to
them.''^° On the contrary, the enforcement agencies of the other three countries may
initiate an investigation on a concentration on their own decision if they believe the
concentration raises doubts/^'
Each regulation sets forth pre-merger notification requirement and waiting period.
Except in the European Community, the waiting period for the parties to merger is 30
days upon notification in the other three countries.''^^ The waiting period in European
Community is three weeks upon request/^"* Exceptionally, the Japanese pre-merger
notification applies to all firms, regardless of their size or market shares."^'* These waiting
periods allow the enforcement agencies to evaluate the transaction in question.
In conclusion, great similarity is found in the merger regulations of each countries
even though there are big and small differences. As a matter of fact, those regulations of
EU, Korea and Japan were modeled after the United States merger regulation.
However, there is great difference in its application. Since Korea and Japan are
more concerned with the growth of their industr\\ they have not placed strong effort on
enforcing regulations which control mergers as well as any other anti-competitive
behavior. These two countries have been keeping lenient application of their rules to
achieve their goals. European seemed to be more active in applying their regulation.
''^'^ See supra text accompanying notes 161.
^''" See supra text accompanying notes 145.
'"'' Op\, supra noXQ 14, at 284.
"'' See supra text accompanying notes 297, 377. 436.
463 Merger Regulation, supra note 1 , art. 7( 1 ).
82
compared to Korea and Japan, their primary was not laid on aggressively blocking anti-
competitive behavior, rather laid on market integration. Therefor, the application of the
merger regulation in EU has been looser than in the United States. The primar>' concern
of the United States merger regulations is to achieve its goal of free competition in the
market through the aggressive application of its antitrust law. As a result, the United
States has been most aggressive in applying their merger regulations, thereby blocking
mergers which may be substantially restrain the competition in a particular field of
market.
Perhaps, these differences in the manner of application, rather than in the measure
itself, makes it much more difficult for the businessmen who are running their business
across their borders to predict the outcome of their business behavior in another country.
No less than knowing the regulation of other countries, an uniformed business regulation
including merger regulation, or negotiation or treaty among countries is needed.
See supra text accompanying notes 435.
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